Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai --skill verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstoregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.02526 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.01263 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00505 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00253 |
Grade A, and why
verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sSL https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/releases/latest/download/slsa-verifier-linux-amd64 \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 192 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Verifying Build Provenance with SLSA and Sigstore
Overview
Build-provenance verification answers a question that defeats many supply-chain attacks: was this artifact actually built from the source I think it was, by the builder I trust, without tampering? Attackers who compromise a build system, swap a compiled release, or inject a malicious step (as in the SolarWinds and 3CX incidents) produce artifacts that look legitimate but lack verifiable provenance. SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts, https://slsa.dev) defines Build levels (L1–L3) describing increasing provenance integrity, and Sigstore (https://www.sigstore.dev) provides the signing and transparency infrastructure: cosign for signing/verifying artifacts and attestations, Fulcio for short-lived keyless certificates bound to an OIDC identity, and Rekor as a tamper-evident transparency log.
This skill covers verifying signatures and SLSA provenance with cosign (cosign verify, cosign verify-attestation, cosign verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (slsa-verifier verify-artifact), enforcing the builder identity (the GitHub Actions workflow that produced the artifact) and the expected source repository. Keyless verification ties trust to an OIDC issuer (e.g., https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com) and a certificate identity rather than a long-lived private key.
This maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise (provenance verification detects/blocks tampered artifacts) and NIST CSF PR.DS-06 (integrity-checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity).
When to Use
- In CI/CD before deploying or promoting any container image or release binary.
- When consuming third-party artifacts (base images, Go/npm releases) that publish attestations.
- When establishing a SLSA Build L3 producer pipeline and enforcing it at the consumer side.
- During incident response to confirm whether a deployed artifact's provenance is intact.
- In admission control (e.g., Kubernetes via policy-controller / Kyverno) to admit only verified images.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 192 lines · 55 tokens per session scan A f2f8c711b285
verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore is a skill published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (57 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 2,526 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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