Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/agenticpawan/fullstack-pilot/azure-security-baselinenpx skills add AgenticPawan/FullStack-Pilot --skill azure-security-baselinegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AgenticPawan/FullStack-PilotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/agenticpawan/fullstack-pilot/azure-security-baseline)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/agenticpawan/fullstack-pilot/azure-security-baseline"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/agenticpawan/fullstack-pilot/azure-security-baseline.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00082 | $0.01293 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00041 | $0.00647 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00259 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00129 |
Grade A, and why
azure-security-baseline scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 147 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Standard IDs
| ID | Benchmark control | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| ASB-NS-1 | Network Security NS-1: no public access to storage | P0 |
| ASB-NS-2 | Network Security NS-2: use private endpoints for PaaS | P1 |
| ASB-IM-1 | Identity Management IM-1: managed identity over keys | P0 |
| ASB-IM-2 | Identity Management IM-2: Key Vault for secrets, not inline | P0 |
| ASB-PA-1 | Privileged Access PA-1: no Owner/Contributor at subscription | P1 |
| ASB-LT-1 | Logging & Threat LT-1: Defender plan enabled | P2 |
Check A — Public storage access (ASB-NS-1)
P0: exploitable now — unauthenticated data read.
// BAD: allowBlobPublicAccess enables anonymous blob read
resource sa 'Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts@2023-01-01' = {
properties: {
allowBlobPublicAccess: true // ASB-NS-1: P0
}
}
// BAD: container-level public access
resource container 'Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/blobServices/containers@2023-01-01' = {
properties: {
publicAccess: 'Blob' // ASB-NS-1: P0
// or publicAccess: 'Container'
}
}
// GOOD
properties: {
allowBlobPublicAccess: false
publicNetworkAccess: 'Disabled'
}
Detection rule: scan .bicep files for allowBlobPublicAccess: true or
publicAccess: 'Blob' or publicAccess: 'Container'.
Check B — Private endpoints for PaaS (ASB-NS-2)
Flag SQL Server, Storage, Key Vault, Service Bus, and Container Registry resources that
have publicNetworkAccess: 'Enabled' without a corresponding privateEndpoints resource.
// BAD: SQL Server open to public network
resource sql 'Microsoft.Sql/servers@2023-02-01-preview' = {
properties: {
publicNetworkAccess: 'Enabled' // ASB-NS-2: P1
}
}
// GOOD: public access disabled, private endpoint defined elsewhere
properties: {
publicNetworkAccess: 'Disabled'
}
Check C — Managed identity over connection-string keys (ASB-IM-1)
P0: key rotation failure = immediate credential exposure.
Scan .bicep files for:
listKeys(function calls assigned to outputs or stored as secretsstorageAccountKey/primaryKey/secondaryKeyreferences in connection-string outputs
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 147 lines · 82 tokens per session scan A 02012862867b
azure-security-baseline is a skill published in the GitHub repository AgenticPawan/FullStack-Pilot (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 82 tokens to every session and 1,293 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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