cherry

Cherry

A cherry target is a third-party web page that has embedded a SLICC follower in an iframe (the webapp loaded with ?cherry=1) using the @ai-ecoverse/cherry host SDK. The host page lends itself to you over cooperative, postMessage-backed synthetic CDP. You drive it exactly like any other browser target — the same BrowserAPI / playwright-cli / teleport surface you already use — but it is capability-limited: the host opted into a small, explicit subset of what a real CDP target allows.

What a cherry target is (and is not)

• It is a cooperative target. The host page is not a Chrome tab you fully control; it is a foreign page that agreed to be driven and gates every CDP domain it exposes. Anything outside the agreed capabilities fails closed.
• You reach it through the same target surface as any tab: it appears in the target registry as kind: 'cherry' with a capabilities shape ({ navigate, network, screenshot }). Navigate it, click in it, read its DOM, and (when allowed) screenshot it with the commands you already know.
• It is driven by a remote leader (you, a cloud cone) over the tray, while the follower iframe runs inside the host page. You never touch the host's network or credentials.

What you can do

The host advertises capabilities; respect them. Typical allowances:

• Navigate the host page's top-level frame (Page.navigate) — only when the host set navigate: true.
• Open a URL in a new host tab/window (Target.createTarget) — only when the host set openUrl: true. This is a host-mediated request, not a tab you own.
• Read and query the DOM and dispatch clicks/keys within the embedded page (DOM.getDocument, DOM.querySelector, DOM.getBoxModel, Input.dispatchMouseEvent, Input.dispatchKeyEvent) and evaluate expressions in the host page realm (Runtime.evaluate). These are the baseline driveable contract; per-domain denials are enforced upstream by the host's permission gate, so a domain may still be refused.