Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add aiocean/claude-plugins/plugin install aio-agent-threatsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/aiocean/claude-plugins/aio-agent-threats)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aiocean/claude-plugins/aio-agent-threats"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aiocean/claude-plugins/aio-agent-threats/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aiocean/claude-plugins/aio-agent-threats"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aiocean/claude-plugins/aio-agent-threats.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00133 | $0.01985 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00053 | $0.00794 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00397 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00198 |
Grade A, and why
aio-agent-threats scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 17d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 116 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AI-Agent Attack-Vector Advisor
"Agents chain tool calls and act with reduced oversight — the autonomy is the exploit primitive."
This skill routes an AI-agent security problem to the right attack vectors in the aio-agent-threats corpus (8 volumes, ~45 articles), shows how each is weaponized in an authorized lab the operator owns, and pairs every vector with detection + mitigation. It is attack-first but complete: offense drives the analysis, defense closes it.
Scope & Authorization
This corpus is for authorized security research — the operator owns the target agents, networks, and tooling. Content is written for a red/blue lab: mechanisms, sanitized example payloads, PoC recipes, and the defenses that stop them. Apply it only to systems you are authorized to test.
Workflow: How to Use This Skill
When triggered, follow these five steps. Do NOT just dump vector descriptions — guide the user through their specific target.
Step 1: ASK — Understand the Target Agent
Gather context (if not already clear):
- What kind of agent? Plain LLM app · tool-calling agent · MCP client/server · RAG / long-term-memory agent · multi-agent system · autonomous coding agent · browser/computer-use agent.
- What does it ingest? User prompts only, or also web pages, emails, PDFs, repo/issue content, tool outputs, retrieved documents, images/audio.
- What can it DO? Tool/capability inventory, shell/file/network access, auto-approve vs human-in-the-loop, egress allowed.
- Does it persist state? Conversation memory, long-term memory store, RAG index, shared multi-agent memory.
- Goal of this engagement? Red-team / build an attack chain · threat-model the attack surface · harden/defend · triage an incident.
If the message already has enough context, go to Step 2.
Step 2: SEARCH — Find Relevant Vectors
Run semantic search with the user's problem as the query, then cross-reference the routing table.
SCRIPTS="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/aio-agent-threats/scripts"
cd "$SCRIPTS" && npx tsx search-vectors.ts "<the user's agent security problem>" --top 6 --json
# first run only, if embeddings.json is missing: npx tsx build-embeddings.ts
What ships with it
52 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- scripts/.gitignore 14 B
- scripts/build-embeddings.ts 2.7 KB runs code
- scripts/embeddings.json 494 KB
- scripts/package-lock.json 37 KB
- scripts/package.json 143 B
- scripts/search-vectors.ts 3.5 KB runs code
- volume-01-foundations/01-agent-attack-surface-taxonomy.md 13 KB
- volume-01-foundations/02-instruction-data-channel-problem.md 14 KB
- volume-01-foundations/03-agent-kill-chain.md 14 KB
- volume-01-foundations/04-owasp-and-nist-crosswalk.md 11 KB
- volume-01-foundations/05-trust-boundaries-and-threat-model.md 11 KB
- volume-02-prompt-injection/01-direct-injection.md 12 KB
- volume-02-prompt-injection/02-indirect-injection.md 14 KB
- volume-02-prompt-injection/03-cross-modal-injection.md 12 KB
- volume-02-prompt-injection/04-system-prompt-extraction-leakage.md 12 KB
- volume-02-prompt-injection/05-obfuscation-and-encoding-payloads.md 12 KB
- volume-02-prompt-injection/06-payload-delivery-and-persistence.md 12 KB
- volume-03-tool-and-mcp/01-tool-poisoning-attack-tpa.md 10 KB
- volume-03-tool-and-mcp/02-mcp-rug-pull-and-integrity-gap.md 9.3 KB
- volume-03-tool-and-mcp/03-tool-shadowing-parasitic-toolchain.md 9.1 KB
- volume-03-tool-and-mcp/04-line-jumping-and-confused-deputy.md 10 KB
- volume-03-tool-and-mcp/05-excessive-agency-and-permission-abuse.md 8.7 KB
- volume-03-tool-and-mcp/06-mcp-cves-and-exposure.md 10 KB
- volume-04-memory-and-context/01-memory-poisoning-minja.md 13 KB
- volume-04-memory-and-context/02-agentpoison-rag-backdoor.md 13 KB
- volume-04-memory-and-context/03-rag-retrieval-poisoning.md 13 KB
- volume-04-memory-and-context/04-persistent-false-beliefs.md 14 KB
- volume-04-memory-and-context/05-cross-session-environment-injection.md 13 KB
- volume-04-memory-and-context/06-misattribution-gap.md 15 KB
- volume-05-multi-agent/01-contagious-poisoning-arcj.md 13 KB
- volume-05-multi-agent/02-agent-to-agent-trust-abuse.md 12 KB
- volume-05-multi-agent/03-orchestrator-hijack.md 11 KB
- volume-05-multi-agent/04-cascading-failures.md 11 KB
- volume-05-multi-agent/05-protocol-attacks-a2a-and-mcp-transport.md 14 KB
- volume-06-jailbreak-evasion/01-multi-turn-crescendo-and-stac.md 13 KB
- volume-06-jailbreak-evasion/02-echo-chamber.md 13 KB
- volume-06-jailbreak-evasion/03-roleplay-persona-and-dan.md 14 KB
- volume-06-jailbreak-evasion/04-encoding-cipher-and-low-resource.md 15 KB
- volume-06-jailbreak-evasion/05-many-shot-jailbreak.md 15 KB
- volume-06-jailbreak-evasion/06-policy-puppetry-and-automated-jailbreaks.md 13 KB
- volume-07-supply-chain-exfiltration/01-coding-agent-weaponization-nx.md 16 KB
- volume-07-supply-chain-exfiltration/02-repository-poisoning.md 14 KB
- volume-07-supply-chain-exfiltration/03-data-exfiltration-channels.md 14 KB
- volume-07-supply-chain-exfiltration/04-real-incidents-devin-copilot.md 16 KB
- volume-07-supply-chain-exfiltration/05-anthropic-espionage-case.md 15 KB
- volume-07-supply-chain-exfiltration/06-model-and-dependency-supply-chain.md 15 KB
- volume-08-defense-hardening/01-detection-signals-and-monitoring.md 18 KB
- volume-08-defense-hardening/02-input-isolation-and-spotlighting.md 18 KB
- volume-08-defense-hardening/03-dual-llm-and-camel.md 18 KB
- volume-08-defense-hardening/04-least-privilege-and-sandboxing.md 17 KB
- volume-08-defense-hardening/05-provenance-tool-attestation-and-mcp-hardening.md 17 KB
- volume-08-defense-hardening/06-defense-in-depth-and-frameworks.md 16 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 17d ago First seen · 116 lines · 133 tokens per session scan A 4180f0f2e46f
aio-agent-threats is a skill published in the GitHub repository aiocean/claude-plugins (4 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 133 tokens to every session and 1,985 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-26.
aio-agent-threats compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| aio-agent-threatsaiocean/claude-plugins | Skill | 4 | 16d ago | MIT | A | 133 | Claude Code |
| eval-hooksFlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide | Skill | 6.4k | today | CC-BY-SA-4.0 | A | 115 | Claude Code |
| design-patternsFlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide | Skill | 6.4k | today | CC-BY-SA-4.0 | A | 59 | Claude Code |
| eval-agentsFlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide | Skill | 6.4k | today | CC-BY-SA-4.0 | A | 80 | Claude Code |
| eval-skillsFlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide | Skill | 6.4k | today | CC-BY-SA-4.0 | A | 60 | Claude Code |
| source-command-audit-whitepapersFlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide | Skill | 6.4k | today | CC-BY-SA-4.0 | A | 26 | Claude Code, Codex |
| audit-agents-skillsFlorianBruniaux/claude-code-ultimate-guide | Skill | 6.4k | today | CC-BY-SA-4.0 | A | 41 | Claude Code |