Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/oauth-flow-exploitationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/oauth-flow-exploitation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/oauth-flow-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/oauth-flow-exploitation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/oauth-flow-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/oauth-flow-exploitation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.02261 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.01130 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00452 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00226 |
Grade A, and why
oauth-flow-exploitation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 173 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OAuth 2.0 Flow Exploitation
When to Use
- When evaluating Single Sign-On (SSO) integrations that allow users to register or log into the application using a third-party Identity Provider (IdP) like Google, Microsoft, or Apple.
- When you intercept a
/authorizeendpoint containing parameters likeclient_id,redirect_uri,response_type=code, andstate. - To establish full Account Takeover (ATO) by linking an attacker's social account to a victim's primary profile.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program
- Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy
- Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes
- SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration
Workflow
Phase 1: Identifying the Authorization Request
# Concept: OAuth relies on bouncing the user between the Client app and the IdP app.
# The security of this entire sequence relies heavily on perfectly implemented parameters.
# 1. Intercept the classic OAuth "Sign in with..." click:
GET /oauth/authorize?client_id=XYZ123&redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback&response_type=code&state=999abc HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
# Key Parameters:
# - redirect_uri: Where the IdP sends the user after login.
# - response_type: `code` (secure server flow) or `token` (insecure implicit frontend flow).
# - state: The anti-CSRF token binding the redirect back to the user's specific web browser session.
Phase 2: Missing or Unvalidated the "State" Parameter (Account Takeover / Linking)
# Concept: If an application allows users to link a social account to their profile,
# and it DOES NOT strictly validate the `state` parameter upon return (CSRF), an attacker can link THEIR
# social account to the VICTIM'S profile.
# Exploit Steps:
# 1. The attacker creates an account on `target.com` and clicks "Link Google Account".
# 2. The attacker logs into their Google account.
# 3. Google redirects the attacker BACK to the target application:
# `https://target.com/callback?code=SECRET_EVIL_CODE&state=`
# 4. **CRUCIAL STEP**: Before the browser loads this URL, the attacker INTERCEPTS and drops the request.
# 5. The attacker constructs a phishing link using that exact URL:
# `https://target.com/callback?code=SECRET_EVIL_CODE`
# 6. The victim (who is currently logged into target.com) clicks the malicious link.
# 7. `target.com` processes the attacker's `SECRET_EVIL_CODE`.
# 8. Success: The attacker's Google account is now permanently attached to the victim's target.com account. The attacker signs in via Google and hijacks the account.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 173 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A efa6f2ba7090
oauth-flow-exploitation is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 2,261 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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