agent-glovebox: Skill for Claude Code

Parallel Audit Skill

The "fan out, confirm, plan, critique" pattern for a wide audit of an existing codebase along multiple quality axes (security, robustness, real-vs-stubbed test coverage, UX, missed opportunities). Output is an audit report + a fix plan on as few PRs as the footprint bound allows, with partitioned commits, + a critique of that plan — no code changes beyond scaffolding the user explicitly asks for.

Hunt ELIMINATORS, not spot fixes

A finding earns its place by naming the property that was violated and the change that closes it. One wrong line patched in place is worth almost nothing at audit scale when it belongs to a class: the same property is violated at the helper's other callers, at the enumeration's other members, and in the next file added to that directory. So each finding carries the property and the change that closes it — the structural change that closes every site at once when a class exists (an SSOT the duplicates collapse into, a type with no invalid arm, one seam every caller must cross, a value the caller passes instead of re-deriving), else a plain FIX that says why this site is genuinely the only one. Prefer the fix that deletes the second implementation over the fix that corrects it.

Four shapes to hunt by name, because a per-dimension prompt finds none of them on its own:

• Fix-sinks — one rule with N implementations, where each bug gets patched into whichever copy the symptom pointed at. The tell is a comment in one copy explaining how it differs from another.
• A shipped defense that does not run — a registered leg nothing dispatches, a gate that returns before its enforcement, a matcher the tests import and the runtime does not. Grep for the runtime importer, never for the definition.
• A published number that is not a measurement — a rate rendered without the denominator it was computed over, an ungraded sample counted as a zero, a count reconstructed by rounding a float.
• UX antipatterns — a degrade path that withholds the whole output rather than a flawed part of it, an error that names no remedy, a guard that refuses without saying which input to change.
• A defense that fails open, or covers only part of the set it names — an error arm that allows where the header says it denies, a timeout whose fallback is the permissive verdict, a deny list that refuses two members of a class its own rationale covers entirely. Enumerate the class from its SSOT, then check each member against the defense; the tell is a rule naming one instance of a class in a file that has no rule for the instance beside it. (Worked example: user-config/settings.json denied GLOVEBOX_DANGEROUSLY_SKIP_MONITOR while seven sibling launch-weakeners — the firewall skip, the allowlist repoint, both cosign trust anchors — had no rule at all.)