eval-leakage-audit

eval-leakage-audit is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from AlexZio00/sovereign-skills. It costs 136 tokens per session (3,479 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A read-only audit for checking whether an evaluation really uses independent evidence. It looks for cases where the test designer, model, and scorer merely confirm one another through 18 known patterns.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to examine metrics, experiments, holdouts, benchmarks, A/B tests, or other claims about how a change will be judged.
Why use it?
A passing benchmark or experiment can still be circular, meaning it measures agreement with its own assumptions rather than real-world quality.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for Claude Code and Codex: user-invocable in frontmatter, but also agents/openai.yaml present.

Part of the eval-leakage-audit plugin — 1 skill shipped together

Good fit Use it to examine metrics, experiments, holdouts, benchmarks, A/B tests, or other claims about how a change will be judged.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add AlexZio00/sovereign-skills --skill eval-leakage-audit
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AlexZio00/sovereign-skills

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Or install eval-leakage-audit, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 1 skill.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for eval-leakage-audit

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for eval-leakage-audit

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/eval-leakage-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 136 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 3,479 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector pass 7 Sept 2026
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00136 $0.03479
Opus 5 $0.00068 $0.01740
Sonnet 5 $0.00027 $0.00696
Haiku 4.5 $0.00014 $0.00348

Measured 5d ago against content hash 7e725410b420, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-12, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

eval-leakage-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

eval-leakage-audit/SKILL.md · 105 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 105 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Eval Leakage Audit — Verification Circularity Audit

Purpose

When some verification (eval/metric/experiment/holdout) gives you confidence that something "worked," this skill checks whether that confidence actually comes from independent external evidence, or whether the people who designed the verification and the model that scores it are just confirming each other (circularity) — via 21 concrete patterns. A passing gate is not proof of quality — it only proves what it was designed to check, and this skill is the executable tool that actually tests that principle in practice.

Dominant variable: does this verification actually receive independent external ground truth, or are the designer, the model, and the scorer mistaking self-confirmation for a result?

Discard if: the target has no evaluation/verification/benchmark concept at all (pure code refactor, doc changes, etc.).

Trigger

  • "audit this eval for leakage", "check if this benchmark is circular", "is this evaluation biased?"
  • "이 검증 순환논리 아닌지 봐줘", "이 평가 편파적이야?", "이 벤치마크 셀프체크야?"
  • /eval-leakage-audit

Workflow

  1. Identify the target verification (eval/metric/experiment/holdout/"how will we know it worked"). Name its components — what plays the model role, what plays the scorer role, what plays the designer role, and which dataset is involved.
  2. Ask the core question: does independent external ground truth actually enter the loop?
  3. Apply all 21 patterns below to the target and report only the ones that actually fire (don't list patterns that didn't fire):
    1. Recall, not reason — the answer was replayed from something already known, not actually derived
    2. Wrong null hypothesis — the ablation only strips the surface label while the actual leaking signal stays in place
    3. Shared hallucination — two components confirm each other and dress up the circularity as a number
    4. Tautology — the scorer grades the bucket it drew itself (precise term: checker_overfit)
    5. Verifier = designer — an unreproducible, undisclosed recipe is passed off as a holdout
    6. Shared-pool bias — train/holdout come from the same labeler pool, so the same bias enters both sides
    7. Frame injection — the question itself hints at the answer
    8. Demand characteristics — the subject being measured knows it's being measured and behaves differently as a result
    9. Dual-fail-flag — when two independent subjects (models/implementations) fail on exactly the same hidden case, suspect a defect in the scorer itself before blaming the subjects. Independent failures coinciding by chance is unlikely — a match more likely points to a shared cause (a scorer bug, or an error in the hidden case itself)
    10. Asymmetric-baseline self-falsification — if the metric itself uses a biased, asymmetric baseline statistic, the null expectation isn't 50%, producing false positives. Before reporting a result, self-falsify the metric with a symmetric check
    11. Evidence-burn — a fixture a model arm has already observed is spent: don't reuse it afterward as independent evidence, a holdout, or a replication fixture. Generate a new variant for the next round, or retire the fixture
    12. Ungraded grader — trusting the scorer/answer-key/rubric itself without self-verifying it first. Before trusting it, run 4 gates: (1) reference-pass — a known-correct implementation scores full marks; (2) buggy-baseline-fail — a deliberately flawed implementation scores in the expected low-to-mid band (too low or too high signals a miscalibrated grader); (3) mutation-kill — the grader actually catches ≥3 plausible wrong answers; (4) dual-fail-flag — if both arms of a comparison fail on the exact same case, treat it as a grader/fixture defect signal, not a candidate failure
    13. Ceiling task — misreading a benchmark saturated at full marks for every candidate (zero discriminative power) as "no difference." A single k=1 pilot showing both arms scoring ≥95% is too thin a sample to confirm a ceiling — flag it only as ceiling_suspected and require 1-2 decisive branching probes (k≥2, or reproduction under a different condition/task variant) before promoting it to confirmed ceiling_detected. Adding more fixtures of the same kind won't by itself recover discriminative power once a ceiling is actually confirmed. Respond by switching task families, promoting process-layer metrics (cost, verification cadence), or adding those branching probes. Post-hoc discriminative-power indicators: ceiling_rate, score_sd, bucket_entropy, winner_flip_rate
    14. Respawn masking — in systems with respawn/reset logic (games, simulations, state machines), scoring by an instant state snapshot lets a respawn disguise failure as a pass (for example: a character dies, auto-respawns, and the snapshot moment shows only alive — the death vanishes). Score by session-wide deterministic invariants instead (for example: death/reset event count = 0, no cumulative resource loss) rather than a state snapshot.
    15. Pseudo-replication — counting multiple probe cells drawn from the same arm as independent sample size n artificially inflates the sample and overstates statistical significance. Distinguish effective independent units (true independent observations) from raw probe cells (repeated measures within the same arm) and do not count the latter toward n.
    16. Stimulus calibration gap — the counterpart to pattern #12 (ungraded grader): even a perfect grader produces meaningless results if the test stimulus itself (question, scenario, prompt) never actually elicits the intended behavior. Run a calibration pass beforehand confirming the reference implementation actually triggers the target behavior for that stimulus.
    17. Unaudited cost-saving skips — leaving cost/time-saving skipped checks unaudited indefinitely lets not-checked quietly harden into no-problem. Even without full re-verification, periodically audit the skipped set via a deterministic minority sample (for example: sha256-minimum hashing).
    18. Goodhart co-evolution in self-improving loops — in a self-improving harness, if the loop designs the very scorer that grades its own improvements, the gate can drift lenient across iterations with no single discrete failure to point to — the loop is quietly reshaping the measure around its own output rather than the measure holding still. Guard with two layers together: fixed anchor tasks the loop never designed and never sees in advance (user-picked, undisclosed), plus a judge the loop doesn't control. Periodically re-check the self-improvement gate for lenient drift instead of trusting a one-time calibration. Ship a deliberately-broken fixture alongside every new capability so the gate's ability to actually fail something stays exercised, not assumed. Credit a harness improvement only against a fresh held-out task, never against the task that produced the improvement in the first place.
    19. Success provenance gap — when an agent lands on the "correct" answer, not distinguishing whether it followed the intended reasoning from the context it was given (authorized context) versus simply picked up the target value in passing during evaluation or retrieval (acquired target) lets one accuracy number hide two different sources of "success." Re-run the same items under three conditions — CLEAN (no target value exposed), GOLD (the correct target value exposed), SHAM (a decoy wrong value exposed) — and measure the GOLD–SHAM gap: a large gap signals the accuracy is coming from value dependence rather than reasoning. [borrowed from arXiv 2607.24054]
    20. Lenient-judge-mode non-disclosure — a self-LLM judge defaults to a lenient grading prompt (partial credit, near-match acceptance, etc.) and the headline number gets reported without ever disclosing that lenient mode was on. Without a strict-mode re-score for comparison, there's no way to tell whether the headline reflects real performance or just grading generosity. Before citing a headline number, confirm whether the grading mode (strict/lenient) is even stated. [borrowed from OpenViking benchmark analysis]
    21. Hardest-category denominator exclusion — a headline accuracy is presented as "M correct out of N total" while the hardest or most adversarial category has quietly been dropped from the denominator (N) before the division. If the exclusion lives only in a footnote or appendix — or isn't disclosed at all — readers can't tell whether the headline means "performance on the easy subset" or "performance overall." Demand per-category numerator/denominator breakdowns, and where a category was excluded, also check that category's own standalone accuracy. [borrowed from OpenViking benchmark analysis]
  4. For every pattern that fires, propose a concrete fix aimed at restoring independence.
  5. Self-check this audit itself against patterns 3–5: is this auditor grading a bucket it drew itself? Is the verifier actually the designer?

Read the full file on GitHub · 105 lines

Files

What ships with it

2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 5d ago Changed · +3 lines 7e725410b420
  2. 13d ago First seen · 102 lines · 136 tokens per session scan A 389fbca275b5

Subscribe to this mod's changes

eval-leakage-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository AlexZio00/sovereign-skills (129 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 136 tokens to every session and 3,479 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.