Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/static-analysisnpx skills add allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin --skill static-analysisgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/allsmog/pwn-claude-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/static-analysis)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/static-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin/static-analysis.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.01553 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00776 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00311 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00155 |
Grade A, and why
PWN Static Analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 246 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
PWN Static Analysis
Overview
Static analysis examines the binary without execution to identify vulnerabilities, understand program flow, and map out exploitation targets. This phase focuses on disassembly, dangerous function identification, and vulnerability pattern recognition.
Analysis Targets
- Main function and program flow
- Vulnerable functions (user input handlers)
- Buffer sizes and stack layouts
- Dangerous function calls
- Potential write primitives
- Leak opportunities
Step 1: Disassemble Key Functions
Using objdump
# Disassemble specific function
objdump -d ./binary | grep -A 50 '<main>:'
# Disassemble all with Intel syntax
objdump -d -M intel ./binary > disasm.txt
Using radare2
# Quick analysis
r2 -A ./binary -c 'pdf @ main' -q
# Full function list
r2 -A ./binary -c 'afl' -q
Using pwntools
from pwn import *
elf = ELF('./binary')
print(disasm(elf.read(elf.symbols['main'], 100)))
Step 2: Identify Dangerous Functions
Buffer Overflow Sources
| Function | Risk | Pattern |
|---|---|---|
gets() |
Critical | No bounds checking |
scanf("%s") |
Critical | No width specifier |
strcpy() |
High | No length check |
strcat() |
High | Can overflow dest |
sprintf() |
High | No bounds on output |
read() |
Medium | Check size vs buffer |
Search for dangerous calls:
objdump -d ./binary | grep -E 'call.*<(gets|strcpy|sprintf|strcat|scanf)@plt>'
Format String Vulnerabilities
Check for user-controlled format strings:
# Look for printf-family calls
objdump -d ./binary | grep -E 'call.*<(printf|fprintf|sprintf|snprintf)@plt>'
Red flags in disassembly:
printfcalled directly after user input- No format string argument (just buffer)
- User buffer passed as first argument to printf
Step 3: Calculate Buffer Sizes
From Disassembly
Look for stack allocation patterns:
; x86_64
sub rsp, 0x40 ; 64 bytes allocated
lea rax, [rbp-0x30] ; Buffer at rbp-0x30 (48 bytes from rbp)
; x86
sub esp, 0x28 ; 40 bytes allocated
lea eax, [ebp-0x20] ; Buffer at ebp-0x20 (32 bytes from ebp)
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 246 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A 29886522b1c9
PWN Static Analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository allsmog/pwn-claude-plugin (2 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 1,553 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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