Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add allsmog/vuln-scout --skill mobile-paymentsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/allsmog/vuln-scoutWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/vuln-scout/mobile-payments)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/vuln-scout/mobile-payments"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/allsmog/vuln-scout/mobile-payments/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/allsmog/vuln-scout/mobile-payments"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/allsmog/vuln-scout/mobile-payments.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00110 | $0.01154 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00055 | $0.00577 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00231 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00115 |
Grade A, and why
Mobile Payment Tokenization Patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 71 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Mobile Payment Tokenization Patterns
When this skill applies
The user is reviewing mobile (Android/iOS) code that handles:
- Card tokenization (PAN/CVV/expiry → opaque token)
- Payment processor SDK integration (Braintree, Stripe, Adyen, FirstData- style iframe encryptors)
- Wallets (Google Pay, Apple Pay, Cash App, Venmo)
- Encrypted PAN encryption in WebViews
- Issuer / PIE (Public Initialization Encryption) key management
Signals: files under **/payment/**, **/checkout/**, **/tokenize*/**, **/services/**/api/, mentions of "PIE key", "iframe shim", "EncryptionListener", "PaymentMethodType".
The PIE / iframe-shim / Braintree tokenization shape
Most modern card tokenization on Android follows this template:
- The app fetches an encryption key (RSA pubkey or symmetric salt) from a backend.
- The app fetches the tokenization endpoint URL from a backend.
- The app builds a JavaScript payload that contains:
- The key material
- The card data (PAN/CVV/expiry) interpolated into JS literals
- A
<script>block that calls into an exposed@JavascriptInterface
- The app dispatches the JS into a WebView with
setJavaScriptEnabled(true). - The WebView's encryption JS produces an opaque token, which the bridge returns to native code.
- The native code submits the token to the processor over HTTPS.
Each step has a corresponding VulnScout detector:
| Step | Detector | What goes wrong |
|---|---|---|
| 2 (URL fetched) | mobile-remote-controlled-endpoint |
Backend supplies an attacker-controlled URL; client follows it. |
| 1 (key fetched) | mobile-webview-js-injection |
Key material is spliced into a JS literal unescaped — break out, run JS. |
| 3-4 (JS dispatch) | mobile-webview-js-injection, mobile-webview-file-access, mobile-webview-js-interface |
WebView config or @JavascriptInterface exposes native callbacks. |
| 5 (bridge) | mobile-js-bridge-payment-token |
Native token object is constructed from JS-controlled values. |
| 6 (submit) | mobile-nsc-narrow-pinning, mobile-nsc-no-pinning, mobile-insecure-tls |
Cert pinning gap on the processor host allows MITM of the token. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 71 lines · 110 tokens per session scan A 5d1eb4473568
Mobile Payment Tokenization Patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository allsmog/vuln-scout (24 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 110 tokens to every session and 1,154 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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