Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi --skill threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/alunduil/alunduil-chezmoiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00095 | $0.01743 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00872 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00349 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00174 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 156 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat modeling
References:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-threats — STRIDE categories.
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-getting-started — the SDL process.
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/larryosterman/threat-modeling-again-what-does-stride-have-to-do-with-threat-modeling — STRIDE-per-element.
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/larryosterman/threat-modeling-again-stride-mitigations — mitigation classes.
A threat model answers what an attacker can do to a design, before the design ships. STRIDE is the categorisation that turns that open question into a finite checklist: for a given design the threats are static, so walking every element against the categories that apply to it terminates.
Work from the design. Engineers know their own system better than they know what an attacker wants from it, and the element walk reaches the same threats without that guess.
Input
The model is a data flow diagram with trust boundaries drawn. Its
element list is the enumeration checklist and its element names are the
threat table's row keys, so the diagram has to exist first — invoke the
dfd skill when it doesn't.
Categories
| Category | Violates | Is |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Authenticity | Using another party's identity — credentials, a signature, an address |
| Tampering | Integrity | Malicious modification of data, at rest or in transit |
| Repudiation | Non-repudiation | Denying an action the system cannot prove happened |
| Information disclosure | Confidentiality | Exposure of data to someone not granted access to it |
| Denial of service | Availability | Denying service to valid users |
| Elevation of privilege | Authorisation | An unprivileged party gaining privileged access |
Element types
Which categories a DFD element is subject to. Enumerate these and stop:
| Element type | Categories |
|---|---|
| External entity | S, R |
| Process | S, T, R, I, D, E |
| Data store | T, R, I, D |
| Data flow | T, I, D |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 156 lines · 95 tokens per session scan A ab1b40feb3dd
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository alunduil/alunduil-chezmoi (2 stars, last pushed today), licensed 0BSD. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 1,743 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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