Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add andreapollastri/larapilot --skill larapilot-settingsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/andreapollastri/larapilotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/andreapollastri/larapilot/larapilot-settings)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andreapollastri/larapilot/larapilot-settings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andreapollastri/larapilot/larapilot-settings.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector fail
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high
- high Privilege Escalation · line 158 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 3 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 22 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 232 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 3 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 12 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 27 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 48 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 251 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 94 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 107 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 109 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 232 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 236 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 237 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00316 | $0.04959 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00158 | $0.02479 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00063 | $0.00992 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00032 | $0.00496 |
Grade A, and why
larapilot-settings scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 272 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Larapilot — Project Settings
Persist project-wide Larapilot settings into .larapilot/config.yaml. All other skills read and honor them.
Shared Runtime
Read .larapilot/shared-runtime.md — Project Settings (effort, backlog, git mode, testing, auto_approve, lucille, decision_log, code_history, dashboard_auth, api_auth, security_scan, github, gitlab, bitbucket, azure, notifications). Bot/webhook/forge setup: .larapilot/integrations.md.
Output Economy
High — short confirmations only. AskQuestion carries the options; chat stays terse. Still honor Zoey's start/end Context estimate lines from shared-runtime.
The Team
| Agent | Role |
|---|---|
| 🤖 Zoey | AI Guru — frames trade-offs (tokens vs depth, human gate vs auto-approve) and confirms persistence |
| 💎 Mark | Product Manager — owns backlog granularity implications (spec/epic count vs traceability) |
| 🚀 Jack | DevOps — owns git_mode and optional GitHub / GitLab / Bitbucket / Azure DevOps integrations |
| ⌨️ Sarah | CLI / Git / Linux — involved when forge/CI automation or Git mechanics guidance is needed |
| 🧪 Anne | Test Architect — owns testing mode implications |
| 🛡️ Robert | Code Reviewer — owns auto_approve risk framing |
| 📒 Lucille | Project tracking — owns the lucille on/exclude setting; default is always ON |
| 🔐 Lars | Security Expert — owns the dashboard_auth toggle + dashboard users (larapilot:dashboard-user), the api_auth toggle (LARAPILOT_API_TOKEN on /larapilot/api/*) and the security_scan toggle (andreapollastri/checkpoint in review/ship) |
| 🔗 Matt | Integration Manager — owns Slack/Discord/Telegram notification toggles (secrets stay in .env) |
Config & CLI
php artisan larapilot:config-show— read currentdata.settings- After answers:
php artisan larapilot:settings-setwith the answered flags - Re-run
config-showand confirm the saved values - Optional probes:
larapilot:github-status,larapilot:gitlab-status,larapilot:bitbucket-status,larapilot:azure-status,larapilot:notify --event=custom --title="Larapilot test" - Dashboard auth users:
php artisan larapilot:dashboard-user {list|add <username>|remove <username>}—addprompts for the password (or takes--password=); credentials hash into.larapilot/auth.yaml(git-ignored)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · +60 lines · +145 tokens per session f8ad21a41039
- 7d ago First seen · 212 lines · 171 tokens per session scan A 33b113306033
larapilot-settings is a skill published in the GitHub repository andreapollastri/larapilot (19 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 316 tokens to every session and 4,959 once invoked, about $0.0016 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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