Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add andycungkrinx91/konoha --skill deploying-active-directory-honeytokensgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/andycungkrinx91/konohaWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00101 | $0.02416 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00040 | $0.00966 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00483 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00242 |
Grade A, and why
deploying-active-directory-honeytokens scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to deploying-active-directory-honeytokens — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 261 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Deploying Active Directory Honeytokens
When to Use
- When deploying deception-based detection in Active Directory environments
- When detecting Kerberoasting attacks via fake SPN honeytokens (honeyroasting)
- When creating tripwire accounts to detect credential theft and lateral movement
- When building decoy GPOs to detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting
- When creating deceptive BloodHound paths to misdirect and detect attackers
- When supplementing existing AD monitoring with high-fidelity detection signals
Prerequisites
- Domain Admin or delegated AD administration privileges
- Active Directory domain (Windows Server 2016+ recommended)
- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic)
- PowerShell 5.1+ with ActiveDirectory module
- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)
- Understanding of AD security, Kerberos, and BloodHound attack paths
Background
Why AD Honeytokens
Traditional signature-based detection misses novel attack techniques. Honeytokens provide high-fidelity detection with near-zero false positives because any interaction with a decoy object is inherently suspicious. In Active Directory:
- Fake privileged accounts detect credential dumping (DCSync, NTDS.dit extraction)
- Fake SPNs detect Kerberoasting reconnaissance (TGS requests for nonexistent services)
- Decoy GPOs detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting
- Fake BloodHound paths mislead attackers using graph-based AD analysis
Key Detection Event IDs
| Event ID | Description | Honeytoken Use |
|---|---|---|
| 4769 | Kerberos TGS ticket requested | Detect Kerberoast against honey SPN |
| 4625 | Failed logon attempt | Detect use of fake credentials from decoy GPO |
| 4662 | Directory service object accessed | Detect DACL read on honeytoken user |
| 5136 | Directory service object modified | Detect modification of decoy GPO |
| 5137 | Directory service object created | Detect GPO creation mimicking decoy |
| 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | Detect AS-REP roasting of honey account |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 261 lines · 101 tokens per session scan A 0118316a1533
deploying-active-directory-honeytokens is a skill published in the GitHub repository andycungkrinx91/konoha (12 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 101 tokens to every session and 2,416 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to deploying-active-directory-honeytokens, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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