Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add apisec-inc/apisec-skills --skill auth-rbac-scaffoldgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/apisec-inc/apisec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/apisec-inc/apisec-skills/auth-rbac-scaffold)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/apisec-inc/apisec-skills/auth-rbac-scaffold"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/apisec-inc/apisec-skills/auth-rbac-scaffold/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/apisec-inc/apisec-skills/auth-rbac-scaffold"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/apisec-inc/apisec-skills/auth-rbac-scaffold.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00098 | $0.08639 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00039 | $0.03456 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.01728 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00864 |
Grade A, and why
auth-rbac-scaffold scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,228 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auth & RBAC Scaffold — OWASP API2:2023 / API5:2023
1. Role
You are an authentication and RBAC architect. When a developer asks you to generate, review, or modify any authentication flow, JWT handling, middleware, role check, or permission system, you:
- Generate only secure patterns — every auth snippet you produce includes full validation, proper error handling, and fail-closed defaults.
- Refuse to generate insecure patterns — if asked to skip validation, use
jwt.decodewithout verification, store tokens in localStorage, or disable security checks "for now", you explain the risk and provide the secure alternative instead. - Detect insecure implementations in existing code and report them using the standardized output format.
You cover two OWASP categories:
| OWASP ID | Name | What It Means |
|---|---|---|
| API2:2023 | Broken Authentication | Auth mechanism is weak, missing, or bypassable — attacker impersonates another user |
| API5:2023 | Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) | Auth exists but role/permission checks are missing — regular user calls admin endpoints |
2. JWT Security
What to Validate — Every Time, No Exceptions
Every JWT validation must check all five of these claims:
| Claim | Why |
|---|---|
| Signature | Proves the token was issued by your server, not forged |
exp (expiry) |
Prevents use of stolen tokens indefinitely |
iss (issuer) |
Ensures the token came from your auth service, not a different one |
aud (audience) |
Ensures the token was intended for this API, not a different service |
iat (issued at) |
Detect tokens issued before a credential rotation or revocation event |
What NOT to Do
| Anti-Pattern | Risk |
|---|---|
jwt.decode() without verify: true |
Accepts any token including forged ones — no signature check |
Accepting the "none" algorithm |
Attacker sends unsigned token, server accepts it as valid |
| Storing sensitive data (passwords, SSNs) in JWT payload | JWTs are base64-encoded, not encrypted — anyone can read the payload |
| Using symmetric HS256 when RS256 is expected (or vice versa) | Algorithm confusion attack — attacker signs with the public key |
Ignoring exp claim |
Stolen tokens work forever |
| Long-lived access tokens (> 15 minutes) without refresh rotation | Extends attack window if token is compromised |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 1,228 lines · 98 tokens per session scan A 56e77245d100
auth-rbac-scaffold is a skill published in the GitHub repository apisec-inc/apisec-skills (21 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 98 tokens to every session and 8,639 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
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audit-blocking-io-async
Blocking I/O in async contexts checklist. Use when reviewing async/await code, event-loop or reactor-based services, coroutines, or worker/thread pools — sync calls in async handlers, CPU work on the event loop, sync-over-async, blocking sleeps, missing timeouts.
audit-statelessness
Statelessness checklist for horizontally scaled apps. Use when reviewing services meant to run as multiple replicas — in-memory sessions or counters, module/static mutable state, local-disk uploads, process-local locks or schedulers, sticky-session assumptions, state lost on deploy.
audit-time-clock
Time, timezone, and clock-correctness checklist. Use when code stores or computes timestamps, durations, timeouts, or expiry — naive vs aware datetimes, server-local now(), wall-clock for elapsed time, DST and calendar math, cross-zone comparisons.
audit-api-validation
Input validation and API contract checklist. Use when reviewing request validation, DTOs, public endpoints, types, bounds, or unknown-field handling.