Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add AppliedIR/sift-mcp --skill finding-skepticgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AppliedIR/sift-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/finding-skeptic)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/finding-skeptic"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/finding-skeptic/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/finding-skeptic"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/finding-skeptic.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.01031 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00412 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00206 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00103 |
Grade A, and why
finding-skeptic scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 104 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Finding skeptic
Challenge each drafted finding before it is shown to the examiner and staged. The examiner then sees only the reviewed version.
There are two parts: the investigator (you, with the investigation's context) and the skeptic (a separate agent that sees only the draft).
Only in an isolated agent
Run the skeptic only as its own agent: a subagent with its own context, or a
separate thread. If your client gives you no way to do that, don't challenge
the finding. Record it without challenged; the examiner sees "Not
challenged". A challenge from the same context that wrote the finding is not
a challenge.
The investigator's part
-
Draft the finding: title, observation, interpretation, confidence, the audit ids it cites, and each artifact's extraction command.
-
Hand the skeptic only the draft, not the investigation narrative or your reasoning.
-
Reassess on the skeptic's report. Choose one outcome:
- stands: nothing in the report changes the finding;
- revised: you change the finding because of the report;
- withdrawn: only under the withdrawal rule below.
-
Fill
alternativesonly with what is meaningful:- an alternative that is still possible:
status: open, with why it stays open; - an alternative the re-run output rules out:
status: ruled_out, with that output quoted inevidenceand its audit ids inaudit_ids.
If the skeptic found nothing and you agree, leave
alternativesout. - an alternative that is still possible:
-
Set
challengedin the finding:outcome(stands,revisedorwithdrawn) andskeptic_audit_ids, the audit ids of the skeptic's own tool calls. Never the finding's own audit ids. -
Present the reviewed version to the examiner, get conversational approval, then call
record_findingon forensic-mcp.
The withdrawal rule
Withdraw only when re-run output contradicts a fact in the observation: the event is absent, the value differs, the file doesn't exist.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 104 lines · 57 tokens per session scan A a5c772ac6dd6
finding-skeptic is a skill published in the GitHub repository AppliedIR/sift-mcp (18 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 1,031 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-12.
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