Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add AppliedIR/sift-mcp --skill vhir-ingestgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AppliedIR/sift-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-ingest)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-ingest"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-ingest/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-ingest"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-ingest.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00061 | $0.00713 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00285 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00143 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
vhir-ingest scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 50 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Investigation Methodology
AFTER EVIDENCE SURVEY, BEFORE INVESTIGATION:
- Run suggest_tools(artifact_type) for each evidence type found
- Run idx_ingest_memory for any memory dumps (tier 2 recommended)
- Upload suspicious binaries to REMnux via upload_from_host + analyze_file
- All text-based evidence (CSV, TSV, log) can be ingested via idx_ingest_delimited regardless of encoding — UTF-16LE auto-detected
- Use run_command with SIFT tools (vol, fls, icat, regripper, strings) for deep analysis beyond indexed data
- Use wintools-mcp for offline evidence analysis on forensic workstation (autorunsc, sigcheck, PECmd)
After ingesting evidence, do NOT default to OpenSearch queries only. The platform has 97+ tools across 9 backends. Use this sequence:
- Scope — idx_case_summary, idx_aggregate, idx_list_detections
- Triage — idx_enrich_triage (baseline), idx_enrich_intel (threat intel)
- Query — idx_search for specific hypotheses
- Deep analysis — run_command with SIFT tools for artifacts that need examination beyond indexed data
- Cross-reference — suggest_tools for each artifact type to discover tools you haven't considered
- Malware — upload_from_host to REMnux for suspicious binaries
- Memory — idx_ingest_memory for memory dumps (3 tiers of Volatility)
When you find a suspicious file, binary, or process:
- check_file on windows-triage for baseline validation
- upload_from_host + analyze_file on REMnux for behavioral analysis
- lookup_ioc on threatintel-mcp for threat intelligence
When you encounter an artifact type you haven't analyzed before:
- suggest_tools(artifact_type="...") on sift-mcp
- get_tool_guidance(tool_name="...") on forensic-mcp
opensearch-mcp (Evidence Indexing + Querying)
Parse, index, and query forensic evidence at scale via OpenSearch. Use these MCP tools for ingestion — do NOT use vhir ingest via Bash.
- Ingest:
idx_ingest(triage packages),idx_ingest_memory(memory dumps),idx_ingest_json,idx_ingest_delimited,idx_ingest_accesslog - Query:
idx_search,idx_count,idx_aggregate,idx_timeline,idx_field_values,idx_get_event - Overview:
idx_case_summary,idx_status,idx_ingest_status - Enrich:
idx_enrich_triage(baseline),idx_enrich_intel(threat intel) - Detect:
idx_list_detections(Hayabusa/Sigma alerts)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 50 lines · 61 tokens per session scan A 72caad095c12
vhir-ingest is a skill published in the GitHub repository AppliedIR/sift-mcp (18 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 61 tokens to every session and 713 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-12.
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