Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add AppliedIR/sift-mcp --skill vhir-malware-escalationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AppliedIR/sift-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-malware-escalation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-malware-escalation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-malware-escalation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-malware-escalation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-malware-escalation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.00563 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00225 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00113 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00056 |
Grade A, and why
vhir-malware-escalation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Malware Analysis Escalation
When connected to remnux-mcp, escalate suspicious files for analysis. Use analyze_file on REMnux when any of these conditions are met:
From sigcheck / autorunsc (wintools-mcp or sift-mcp):
- Unsigned binaries in system directories (System32, SysWOW64, Windows)
- Binaries with invalid or expired signatures
- Unsigned autorun entries (services, scheduled tasks, Run keys)
From PECmd / AmcacheParser (wintools-mcp or sift-mcp):
- Prefetch entries for executables not recognized as standard or enterprise software
- Amcache entries for executables with no corresponding installer or update record
- Executables in unusual paths (Temp, AppData, Recycle Bin, ProgramData)
From densityscout / strings / bstrings:
- High entropy scores (packed or encrypted binaries)
- Suspicious string patterns (base64-encoded commands, obfuscated URLs, known C2 patterns)
From hollows_hunter / moneta (wintools-mcp):
- Process injection detected (hollowed processes, injected threads)
- Suspicious memory regions with executable permissions
- Submit the dumped files, not just the detection report
From CAPA / YARA:
- CAPA identifies capabilities like process injection, credential access, C2 communication
- YARA rules match known malware signatures or suspicious patterns
- Use
analyze_filewithdepth: "deep"for comprehensive analysis
From windows-triage-mcp:
check_filereturns UNKNOWN for files in system directories — investigate further, do not assume malicious, but if other indicators are present, escalate to REMnuxcheck_hashmatches a known vulnerable driver (LOLDriver)
From network analysis (tshark / zeek):
- Suspicious payloads captured in PCAP — extract and submit to REMnux
- Beaconing patterns identified — extract the binary responsible
General rule: If you find a file that is suspicious but cannot determine its purpose from metadata and context alone, submit it to REMnux before drawing conclusions. REMnux analyze_file returns structured findings in neutral language — treat its output as evidence to be interpreted, not as a verdict.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 45 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A b93b220c81e7
vhir-malware-escalation is a skill published in the GitHub repository AppliedIR/sift-mcp (18 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 563 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-12.
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