Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add AppliedIR/sift-mcp --skill vhir-tool-referencegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AppliedIR/sift-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-tool-reference)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-tool-reference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-tool-reference/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-tool-reference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/appliedir/sift-mcp/vhir-tool-reference.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.04158 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.01663 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00832 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00416 |
Grade A, and why
vhir-tool-reference scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 379 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Tool Reference
Tool selection and investigation workflows. Tools first, text second.
Critical Rules
1. Query Before Conclusions
WRONG: User asks about IOC -> Write response -> Then query tools
RIGHT: User asks about IOC -> Query tools FIRST -> Write response based on results
2. Parallel Tool Calls
When multiple queries needed, call ALL in a single message:
WRONG: [Tool 1] -> wait -> [Tool 2] -> wait -> [Tool 3]
RIGHT: [Tool 1, Tool 2, Tool 3] -> wait once -> all results
Backend Availability
Not all backends are installed on every deployment. Check what's available before planning a workflow:
| Backend | Quick tier | Recommended tier | How to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| forensic-mcp | Always | Always | vhir service status |
| sift-mcp | Always | Always | vhir service status |
| windows-triage | No | Yes | vhir service status |
| forensic-rag | No | Yes | vhir service status |
| threatintel-mcp | No | If configured | vhir service status |
| remnux-mcp | No | User-provided | vhir service status |
| wintools-mcp | No | User-provided | vhir service status |
If a backend is unavailable, skip its steps in workflows below and note the gap. Do not fail the investigation — degrade gracefully.
Decision Framework
User Question
|
v
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| File to analyze (PE, PDF, Office, ELF, archive, script)? |
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| YES | NO
v v
+--------------+ +-----------------------------------------------------------+
| remnux-mcp | | Contains IOC (IP, hash, domain, URL)? |
| analyze_file | | Contains "malicious", "threat actor", "APT", "CVE"? |
+--------------+ +-----------------------------------------------------------+
| YES | NO
v v
+--------------+ +-----------------------------------+
| threatintel-mcp | | Contains "detect", "sigma", |
| FIRST | | "event ID", "MITRE", "hunt"? |
+--------------+ +-----------------------------------+
| YES | NO
v v
+-------------+ +---------------------------+
| forensic- | | File/process to validate? |
| rag FIRST | +---------------------------+
+-------------+ | YES | NO
v v
+--------------+ +----------+
| windows- | | sift-mcp |
| triage | | tools |
+--------------+ +----------+
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 379 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A 2ec8bbcd93a0
vhir-tool-reference is a skill published in the GitHub repository AppliedIR/sift-mcp (18 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 4,158 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-12.
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