Answer ANY question about the threat model in this repo — read-only Q&A over the committed threat-model.yaml. The default surface for every natural-language query about the model, however simple: does one exist at all ("is there a threat model here?", "gibt es hier ein bedrohungsmodell?"), how it stands ("how bad is…
Audit the current repository against a security requirements catalog and verify whether each requirement is implemented. Requirement IDs follow your catalog's own naming scheme (e.g. SEC-CSP-1, SCG-HARDENXML, or anything your YAML defines); tagging code with those IDs is optional and not required. Prints open…
Standalone AuthN/AuthZ review of any repository. Runs three deterministic Python scanners (route inventory, auth-check scanner, IDOR confirmer) and dispatches a specialized agent that reasons over the combined output: cross-component IDOR chains, RBAC coverage gaps, JWT misconfiguration, and privilege-escalation…
Preflight the Claude Code permission allow-list for the AppSec plugin. Reports which Bash/Write/Edit/Read rules from data/required-permissions.yaml are missing from the user's settings.json, so unattended /appsec-advisor:create-threat-model runs do not block on prompts. Read-only by default; --update merges missing…
Remove stale run-state files left behind by a crashed or abruptly terminated threat-model assessment. Refuses to clean when an active run is still holding the lock. Use when the Claude Code UI shows the threat-modeling skill as "scanning" forever after a session crash.
Perform a threat assessment of a repository and produce a threat-model.md. Supports --repo to analyze external repos and --output to set the output directory. Use --requirements to check the findings against a security requirements catalog; no separate setup command is needed for that. Optionally also writes…
Maintainer/dev skill that triages an anonymised diagnostic bundle (appsec-diag-.tgz, produced by scripts/diagnosticbundle.py) a user sent after a pipeline failure. Runs the deterministic inspect, then cross-references the plugin source (scripts/, compact runtimes, agents/, AGENTS.md) and known-bug history to produce a…
Find the plugin defects behind the issues a create-threat-model run recorded. Reads .run-issues.json, re-reads each symptom next to the plugin's own code, and reports a file:line root cause per issue, or classifies it as an environment or expected condition. Read-only against the plugin; writes only .run-bugs.json.…
Developer/test skill that grades the SEMANTIC quality of a produced threat model (plausibility, severity proportionality, STRIDE coverage, mitigation actionability, missed surfaces) via a find→adversarial-verify loop over a frozen run. Complements the structural pytest/qachecks suite; does NOT re-run the pipeline.
Re-export a finished threat-model.yaml/.md into PDF + HTML + SARIF + pentest-tasks artifacts, or the alpha OWASP Threat Dragon / ThreatAtlas JSON. Standalone post-processing — does not analyze the repo, does not run any agent. SARIF, pentest-tasks and Threat Dragon are derived deterministically from threat-model.yaml…
Identify and apply fixes for issues recorded by the previous create-threat-model run. Auto-applies safe fixes with confirmation; prints manual-review guidance for everything else.
Show what this plugin can do and which entry point fits the task — the starting point when someone does not know the commands yet ("what can appsec-advisor do?", "which commands are there?", "how do I start?", "wie fange ich an?", "was kann das plugin?", "help"). Prints a short command reference with example calls…
Install the secure-coding baseline into Claude Code's instruction files, so the coding rules are in context on every prompt instead of only the ones that mention security. Menu-driven: this machine (/.claude/CLAUDE.md), this repository (project CLAUDE.md), or this repository without touching CLAUDE.md…
Publish a completed threat model to version control. Runs pre-flight security checks (repo visibility, secret scan), patches .gitignore with negation exceptions for the publishable files, and creates a signed git commit with threat-count metadata. Keeps pentest-tasks.yaml and all intermediate files permanently ignored.
Remove an installed secure-coding baseline from Claude Code's instruction files, so the rules stop loading at the next session start. Drops the import by default and leaves the file on disk; deleting the file is a separate step that is always confirmed first, because the plugin cannot tell a copy it wrote from one the…
User-facing skill for reporting a pipeline error. Builds an anonymised diagnostic bundle (appsec-diag-.tgz) from the failed run via scripts/diagnosticbundle.py, shows the user exactly what it contains, and tells them to review it and attach it to a GitHub issue. The bundle carries only tool versions, run shape, and…
User-facing triage of an existing threat model — an overview-first console over an already-generated threat-model.yaml (backlog by priority, severity mix, worst-case scenarios), then one of three modes. "Just look around" browses findings read-only by severity, security aspect, requirement, or control posture. "Fix or…
Deterministic quick Security Score (0-100) for a repository, computed from the scanner layer alone — no agents, no LLM, no threat model, nothing written into the target repository. Reports the score together with how many rules applied, the finding tally, and the weakest control domains. Use for a fast indication or a…
Write the required Claude Code permission allow-list into a target repository so that /appsec-advisor:create-threat-model runs without permission prompts. One-shot setup; idempotent.
Print the standard summary block of the current threat model — scan identity, findings by severity, the remediation backlog (P1/P2/P3) and mitigation coverage, the worst-case scenarios, control posture, and whether the model is still up to date. A DISPLAY command, not a question-answering surface: use it only for an…
Read-only overview of the AppSec plugin — version, available features, last-run identity, and configuration sources. Does not analyze or modify anything.
Read-only three-check health probe for the threat model. Checks (1) whether a threat model exists and is still current, (2) whether intermediate artifacts are present and should be cleaned up, and (3) whether a threat model assessment is currently running. Check 3 runs first; if a run is active checks 1 and 2 are…