Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills --skill security-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills/security-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.02972 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.01486 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00594 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00297 |
Grade A, and why
security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 427 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Audit Skill
Overview
This skill performs systematic security audits of Move contracts using a comprehensive checklist. Every item must pass before deployment.
Critical: Security is non-negotiable. User funds depend on correct implementation.
Core Workflow
Step 1: Run Security Checklist
Review ALL categories in order:
- Access Control - Who can call functions?
- Input Validation - Are inputs checked?
- Object Safety - Object model used correctly?
- Reference Safety - No dangerous references exposed?
- Arithmetic Safety - Overflow/underflow prevented?
- Generic Type Safety - Phantom types used correctly?
- Testing - 100% coverage achieved?
Step 2: Access Control Audit
Verify:
- All
entryfunctions verify signer authority - Object ownership checked with
object::owner() - Admin functions check caller is admin
- Function visibility uses least-privilege
- No public functions modify state without checks
Check for:
// ✅ CORRECT: Signer verification
public entry fun update_config(admin: &signer, value: u64) acquires Config {
let config = borrow_global<Config>(@my_addr);
assert!(signer::address_of(admin) == config.admin, E_NOT_ADMIN);
// Safe to proceed
}
// ❌ WRONG: No verification
public entry fun update_config(admin: &signer, value: u64) acquires Config {
let config = borrow_global_mut<Config>(@my_addr);
config.value = value; // Anyone can call!
}
For objects:
// ✅ CORRECT: Ownership verification
public entry fun transfer_item(
owner: &signer,
item: Object<Item>,
to: address
) acquires Item {
assert!(object::owner(item) == signer::address_of(owner), E_NOT_OWNER);
// Safe to transfer
}
// ❌ WRONG: No ownership check
public entry fun transfer_item(
owner: &signer,
item: Object<Item>,
to: address
) acquires Item {
// Anyone can transfer any item!
}
Step 3: Input Validation Audit
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 427 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A 784808b250e1
security-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository aptos-labs/aptos-agent-skills (19 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 2,972 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
official-sui-skills
Pointer to the official Mysten Labs skills for building on Sui — language fundamentals, object model, PTBs, SDKs, publishing, upgrades, frontend integration, accessing on-chain data. Maintained upstream at github.com/MystenLabs/skills; pinned to the same ref the audit catalog derives from (see…
sui-and-move-tools
Use to get bytecode for a deployed Sui package and produce a disassembled working view. One GraphQL call fetches every module's raw bytecode bytes; sui move disassemble (already on the system, running sui prompt) produces .asm files for analysis. Trigger on "fetch this package's bytecode", "get me the .mv for package…
web3-audit
Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for…
sora-taira-testnet
Work against the SORA Taira testnet through its deployed Torii MCP endpoint for live account, asset, alias, contract, governance, Musubi package-registry, and transaction workflows. Use when Codex needs to inspect or mutate the Taira testnet, verify or add https://taira.sora.org/v1/mcp, prefer the curated iroha. tool…
mochi-local-sandbox
Bring up and use a Mochi-managed local Iroha sandbox plus its local Torii MCP endpoint. Use when Codex needs a reliable local devnet, needs to print or verify the codex mcp add mochi-local --url ... command, or should consume the generated .env.local and .mochi/generated/ bootstrap files for local-only development.
TronScan Data Lookup
Query TRON blockchain data via the TronScan API — accounts, transactions, tokens, blocks, contracts, transfers, and chain statistics.