forensics

A file-forensics toolset for identifying files, extracting readable text, reading gzip-compressed logs, and calculating file hashes. A hash is a fingerprint used to recognize an exact file.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to inspect binaries, scripts, web shells, and system or web-server logs, identify file types, search embedded strings, read gzip logs, and record hashes.
Why use it?
It provides a consistent way to inspect suspicious files and compressed logs when common command-line utilities are unavailable. It can help preserve useful evidence such as embedded URLs, IP addresses, or malware indicators.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/asaotomo/deepsentry/forensics
Any agent
npx skills add asaotomo/DeepSentry --skill forensics
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/asaotomo/DeepSentry

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 32 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 461 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00032 $0.00461
Opus 5 $0.00016 $0.00230
Sonnet 5 $0.00006 $0.00092
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00046

Measured 2d ago against content hash 867c28a214e3, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

forensics scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/forensics/SKILL.md · 37 lines

What it actually says

文件取证 Skill

何时使用

  • 分析可疑二进制、Webshell、恶意样本
  • 读取 .gz 压缩日志(auth.log、nginx access.log 等)
  • 目标系统无 filestringszcatgunzip 命令

工具选用

场景 工具 示例
文件是什么类型 file_ident {"tool_name":"file_ident","tool_args":{"path":"/tmp/suspicious"}}
提取硬编码字符串/IP/URL file_strings {"tool_name":"file_strings","tool_args":{"path":"/var/www/x.php","pattern":"eval|base64"}}
读 gzip 日志 read_gzip {"tool_name":"read_gzip","tool_args":{"path":"/var/log/auth.log.1.gz","lines":"100"}}
不确定是否 gzip read_log {"tool_name":"read_log","tool_args":{"path":"/var/log/syslog","pattern":"Failed"}}
文件哈希 file_hash {"tool_name":"file_hash","tool_args":{"path":"/bin/busybox"}}

推荐流程

  1. file_ident — 确认文件类型(ELF/PHP/GZIP/文本)
  2. 若为 gzip 日志 → read_logread_gzip + pattern 过滤
  3. 若为二进制/可疑脚本 → file_strings + pattern
  4. file_hash — 留存 IOC

限制

  • 单文件读取上限 5MB(压缩),解压上限 20MB
  • strings 扫描上限 2MB
  • 禁止读取 config.yaml / reports/ 等受保护路径
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 37 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A 867c28a214e3

Subscribe to this mod's changes

forensics is a skill published in the GitHub repository asaotomo/DeepSentry (24 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 461 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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