github

github is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks. It costs 19 tokens per session (936 once invoked), scanned A, original, CC0-1.0.

A GitHub connection for searching and working with repositories on GitHub, a service for hosting and collaborating on code.

In plain words
What is it for?
It helps search repositories and carry out supported GitHub tasks through the official connection.
Why use it?
It avoids switching to GitHub for repository work and supports controlled access to the user's selected repositories.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit It helps search repositories and carry out supported GitHub tasks through the official connection.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github
About the project

System Prompts Leaks is a collection of captured system instructions used to guide AI chatbots and coding agents before they receive user messages. It serves researchers and developers studying how different AI assistants are directed.

asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks · 70,001 stars · on GitHub

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks --skill github
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for github

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for github

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks/github.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 19 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 936 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00019 $0.00936
Opus 5.5 $0.00008 $0.00374
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00004 $0.00187
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00094

Measured 17d ago against content hash ac584b51e538, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

github scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 17d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Meta/muse-agent/skills/github/SKILL.md · 77 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 77 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

GitHub

Use the installed github CLI. Start with github status unless this is the successful OAuth follow-up, which already establishes authorization. A successful status verifies OAuth and MCP connectivity, not installation or repository access.

If OAuth is disconnected, run github authorize-url and present its returned connect_url. Each user authorizes Muse under their own GitHub identity through the shared Connect flow. Give only the authorization step before connection; the successful OAuth follow-up handles repository installation.

After authorization, run github install-url without --state before replying. Do not construct the URL yourself or reuse OAuth state. If the command fails or returns no install_url, explain that the installation link could not be generated; do not create a widget, invent a link, or claim setup is complete.

Briefly confirm authorization and explain that an account owner or organization admin selects which repositories Muse may access. Present the exact returned install_url with widget.create, using kind: "list". In data.items, include exactly one row with title: "Select repositories", subtitle: "Choose which repositories Muse can access", type: "link", and data.url copied from install_url. Set the row's image_url to GitHub's official icon: https://github.githubassets.com/images/modules/logos_page/GitHub-Mark.png. Omit the list heading. Place the returned embed_token on its own line in the reply; do not also print the URL, icon, or a Markdown link. The row opens GitHub to install or configure repository access.

If widget.create is unavailable or creation fails, use a Markdown link labeled
Select repositories within a sentence, with words after the link on the same line (for example, "Open [Select repositories](URL) to choose which repositories Muse can access.", substituting the exact returned URL). Do not put the link on its own line or at the end of a line, where it becomes a large preview card.

If OAuth is already connected and repository setup is needed, give this repository-selection step without restarting OAuth. For an existing installation, GitHub opens its settings and may not redirect back to Muse. Ask the user to return to chat after configuring repository access.

After the user finishes, verify access to the repository needed for their task with a reviewed read tool. Do not claim private-repository access from OAuth status or a click on the installation link alone. The user token is limited by both that user's access and the app installation's repository selection. Installation does not require repeating OAuth.

Do not disconnect or repeat OAuth just because a repository is missing. Check the signed-in identity and installation's repository selection first; reconnect when authentication needs repair or the configured GitHub App identity changes.

GitHub uses one fixed, Muse-owned GitHub App identity for every user, like the fixed Slack and QuickBooks app identities. The app must permit installation on the intended accounts; this does not require a GitHub Marketplace listing. During validation, install it only on disposable test repositories. Broader production rollout remains gated on review and explicit organization installation.

Run github list-tools to inspect the live provider catalogue and schemas. Each tool includes a local hatch_command classification:

  • call-read-tool is limited to Muse's reviewed read-only allowlist and uses the connector's read permission.
  • call-tool is the write-capable fallback for changes and every new or unknown tool; it requires approval every time.

Call the tool using the returned command:

github call-read-tool --name <reviewed-read-tool> --arguments-json '<json-object>'
github call-tool --name <write-or-unknown-tool> --arguments-json '<json-object>'

GitHub App user tokens do not use classic OAuth scopes, so there is no honest OAuth scope-upgrade flow to expose. Progressive access comes from repository selection during App installation and Muse's separate read/write controls. Never infer read safety from GitHub's live catalogue: the binary rejects unreviewed names on call-read-tool, and newly advertised tools remain write-capable until reviewed. Never request OAuth tokens or app credentials in chat.

Read the full file on GitHub · 77 lines

Files

What ships with it

2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 17d ago First seen · 77 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A ac584b51e538

Subscribe to this mod's changes

github is a skill published in the GitHub repository asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks (70,001 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed CC0-1.0. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 936 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-05.