Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add autohandai/community-skills --skill analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attackgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/autohandai/community-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/autohandai/community-skills/analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/autohandai/community-skills/analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/autohandai/community-skills/analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/autohandai/community-skills/analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/autohandai/community-skills/analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.02294 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.01147 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00459 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00229 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
89% identical to analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack — 42 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 256 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Analyzing Threat Actor TTPs with MITRE ATT&CK
Overview
MITRE ATT&CK is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) based on real-world observations. This skill covers systematically mapping threat actor behavior to the ATT&CK framework, building technique coverage heatmaps using the ATT&CK Navigator, identifying detection gaps, and producing actionable intelligence reports that link observed IOCs to specific adversary techniques across the Enterprise, Mobile, and ICS matrices.
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with
mitreattack-python,attackcti,stix2libraries - MITRE ATT&CK Navigator (web-based or local deployment)
- Understanding of ATT&CK matrix structure: Tactics, Techniques, Sub-techniques
- Access to threat intelligence reports or MISP/OpenCTI for threat actor data
- Familiarity with STIX 2.1 Attack Pattern objects
Key Concepts
ATT&CK Matrix Structure
The ATT&CK Enterprise matrix organizes adversary behavior into 14 Tactics (the "why") containing Techniques (the "how") and Sub-techniques (specific implementations). Each technique has associated data sources, detections, mitigations, and real-world procedure examples from observed threat groups.
Threat Group Profiles
ATT&CK catalogs over 140 threat groups (e.g., APT28, APT29, Lazarus Group, FIN7) with documented technique usage. Each group profile includes aliases, targeted sectors, associated campaigns, software used, and technique mappings with procedure-level detail.
ATT&CK Navigator
The ATT&CK Navigator is a web-based tool for creating custom ATT&CK matrix visualizations. Analysts create layers (JSON files) that annotate techniques with scores, colors, comments, and metadata to visualize threat actor coverage, detection capabilities, or risk assessments.
Practical Steps
Step 1: Query ATT&CK Data Programmatically
from attackcti import attack_client
import json
# Initialize ATT&CK client (queries MITRE TAXII server)
lift = attack_client()
# Get all Enterprise techniques
enterprise_techniques = lift.get_enterprise_techniques()
print(f"Total Enterprise techniques: {len(enterprise_techniques)}")
# Get all threat groups
groups = lift.get_groups()
print(f"Total threat groups: {len(groups)}")
# Get specific group by name
apt29 = [g for g in groups if 'APT29' in g.get('name', '')]
if apt29:
group = apt29[0]
print(f"Group: {group['name']}")
print(f"Aliases: {group.get('aliases', [])}")
print(f"Description: {group.get('description', '')[:200]}")
What ships with it
7 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 256 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A bc3d62859930
analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack is a skill published in the GitHub repository autohandai/community-skills (11 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 2,294 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 89% identical to analyzing-threat-actor-ttps-with-mitre-attack, differing in 42 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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