Agentic Bug Hunter is a terminal toolkit that uses AI to investigate security targets, test for vulnerabilities, validate findings, and write bug bounty reports. It is for ethical hackers submitting findings to platforms such as HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, or Immunefi, and can resume previous sessions. The catalogue entries package commands, skills, agents, instructions, hooks, and settings for using the toolkit.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill mobile-pentestgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/mobile-pentest)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/mobile-pentest"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/mobile-pentest/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/mobile-pentest"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/mobile-pentest.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00205 | $0.04599 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00082 | $0.01840 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00041 | $0.00920 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00460 |
Grade A, and why
mobile-pentest scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 330 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MOBILE APP PENTEST (ANDROID / iOS)
Mobile apps talk to the same backend as the web app — but they ship a different, less-hunted attack surface: base URLs, API endpoints, header schemes, and hardcoded secrets that web recon never sees. Most hunters skip mobile. That's the edge.
The whole point: the APK/IPA is a copy of the client. Decompile it once and you get every endpoint the web JS never references, every staging/internal base URL, and often a live API key sitting in
strings.xml. Then you attack the backend like any web target.
RUNTIME-FIRST — THE ONE RULE THAT MATTERS
Do NOT start by decompiling. Decompiling first burns hours recovering crypto you may never need. Default order:
1. Install the app on a device/emulator (in scope confirmed via /scope)
2. Point it at Burp / mitmproxy
3. Drive the real business flows by hand (login, pay, edit profile, share)
4. After each action, check the proxy: are requests visible and replayable?
5. Traffic visible + replayable → STOP. Test the API like a web target.
6. Traffic pinned / encrypted / absent → THEN escalate to apktool/jadx/Frida.
Most of your paid mobile bugs (IDOR, auth bypass, business logic) come from step 5 — plain HTTP traffic you replay in Burp. Reversing (apktool/jadx/Frida) is a support step to get traffic flowing or to recover a request signer, not the goal.
If Burp already has a stable, replayable request, you are done reversing. Switch to server-side testing.
0. SCOPE CHECK FIRST
Mobile has its own scope traps. Before touching the binary:
- Is the app itself in scope, or only the web domains? Many programs list the app package (
com.target.app) explicitly. If only*.target.comis listed, the API endpoints the app calls are usually in scope — but the app binary analysis may not be. Run/scope. - Third-party SDKs (analytics, ads, crash reporters) bundled in the APK are out of scope — they belong to Firebase/Sentry/AppsFlyer, not the target.
- Don't report "app is debuggable" / "no root detection" / "no obfuscation" — these are N/A on almost every program (no real-world attacker impact). See the Never-Submit list below.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 330 lines · 205 tokens per session scan A 74690f0bcf60
mobile-pentest is a skill published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (5,367 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 205 tokens to every session and 4,599 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
apk-redteam-pipeline
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bugcrowd-reporting
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints…
evidence-hygiene
Evidence-capture and PoC-redaction discipline for bug-bounty submissions: cookie redaction protocol (which fields to mask, Preview annotation / Burp panel hiding / DevTools workflow), PII black-bar discipline (what to mask in other-user data — names, emails, phones, faces — vs what is safe to leave — usernames, trace…
hunt-api-misconfig
Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {isadmin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this…
enterprise-vpn-attack
External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials…
hunt-ato
Hunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable/numeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry/reuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session…