triage-validation

triage-validation is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter. It costs 87 tokens per session (3,415 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A checklist for deciding whether a suspected security finding is real, reproducible, in scope, and worth submitting to a bug bounty program.

In plain words
What is it for?
It supports finding validation, accepted-impact checks, severity decisions, rejection screening, and pre-submission review.
Why use it?
It prevents researchers from spending time on unproven or rejected reports and helps them state the exact attack steps and impact.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

About the project

Agentic Bug Hunter is a terminal toolkit that uses AI to investigate security targets, test for vulnerabilities, validate findings, and write bug bounty reports. It is for ethical hackers submitting findings to platforms such as HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, or Immunefi, and can resume previous sessions. The catalogue entries package commands, skills, agents, instructions, hooks, and settings for using the toolkit.

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 4,703 stars · on GitHub

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/triage-validation
Any agent
npx skills add Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill triage-validation
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for triage-validation

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/triage-validation.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/triage-validation)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/triage-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/triage-validation.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 87 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 3,415 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00087 $0.03415
Opus 5 $0.00044 $0.01707
Sonnet 5 $0.00017 $0.00683
Haiku 4.5 $0.00009 $0.00342

Measured yesterday against content hash 0211a4bf1c6a, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

triage-validation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md · 310 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 310 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

TRIAGE & VALIDATION

One wrong answer = STOP. Kill it. Move on.

"N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes all 7 questions."


THE 7-QUESTION GATE

Ask IN ORDER. One wrong answer = STOP immediately.


Q1: Can an attacker use this RIGHT NOW, step by step?

Complete this template:

1. Setup:   I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body — copy-paste ready]
3. Result:  I can [read / modify / delete] [exact data shown in response]
4. Impact:  The real-world consequence is [account takeover / PII read / money stolen]
5. Cost:    Time: [X minutes], Capital: [$0 / $X subscription required]

If you CANNOT write step 2 as a real HTTP request → KILL IT.


Q2: Is the impact on the program's accepted impact list?

Go to the program page. Find "Vulnerability Types" or "Out of Scope."

Common tiers:

  • Critical: Any-user ATO without interaction, RCE, SQLi with data exfil, admin auth bypass
  • High: Mass PII exfil, privilege escalation, internal SSRF with data, stored XSS all users
  • Medium: IDOR on specific user non-critical data, XSS on sensitive page requiring click
  • Low: Non-sensitive info disclosure, clickjacking with PoC

If your bug maps to a listed exclusion → KILL IT.


Q3: Is the root cause in an in-scope asset?

Confirm:

  • Vulnerable domain is on the in-scope list (not *.internal.target.com)
  • It's a production asset (not staging/dev unless explicitly in scope)
  • It's not a third-party service the company just uses (not Stripe, Salesforce, Google Auth)

If out-of-scope → KILL IT.


Q4: Does it require privileged access that an attacker can't realistically get?

  • "Admin can do X" = centralization risk = KILL IT (on 99% of programs)
  • "Non-admin can do X that only admin should do" = valid
  • "Requires physical access / MFA device" = usually invalid
  • "Requires compromised victim account to work" = questionable, low severity at best

Read the full file on GitHub · 310 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 310 lines · 87 tokens per session scan A 0211a4bf1c6a

Subscribe to this mod's changes

triage-validation is a skill published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,703 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 87 tokens to every session and 3,415 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.

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