Threat Modeling MCP Server is an MCP server that guides an AI coding agent through structured security threat modeling and code validation. It analyzes business context, architecture, assets, trust boundaries, and threat actors, then produces Markdown or JSON reports using a phased STRIDE-based process. The catalogue skills operate this workflow through compatible agent clients.
Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server/main/.kiro/skills/phase-6-threat-identification/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-serverWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server/phase-6-threat-identification)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server/phase-6-threat-identification"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server/phase-6-threat-identification/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server/phase-6-threat-identification"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server/phase-6-threat-identification.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.01256 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00628 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00251 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00126 |
Grade A, and why
phase-6-threat-identification scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 130 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Phase 6: Threat Identification (STRIDE)
Objective
Systematically identify threats using the STRIDE methodology against every component, connection, and asset flow documented in previous phases.
STRIDE Categories
S - Spoofing (violates Authentication)
Can identities be faked?
- Authentication bypass, session hijacking, credential theft, certificate forgery
- Where to look: Login endpoints, API authentication, service-to-service auth
T - Tampering (violates Integrity)
Can data or code be modified?
- SQL injection, XSS, man-in-the-middle, config tampering, code injection
- Where to look: Input fields, data in transit, stored data, configuration files
R - Repudiation (violates Non-repudiation)
Can actions be denied?
- Log tampering, missing audit trails, unsigned transactions
- Where to look: Logging infrastructure, audit trails, transaction records
I - Information Disclosure (violates Confidentiality)
Can data leak?
- Data breaches, verbose errors, unencrypted transmission, directory traversal
- Where to look: Error handling, API responses, data flows, storage
D - Denial of Service (violates Availability)
Can availability be impacted?
- DDoS, resource exhaustion, algorithmic complexity, connection pool exhaustion
- Where to look: Public endpoints, resource-intensive operations, queues
E - Elevation of Privilege (violates Authorization)
Can permissions be escalated?
- Privilege escalation, IDOR, missing access controls, role manipulation
- Where to look: Authorization checks, role assignments, admin functions
Per-Element STRIDE Relevance
| Element Type | S | T | R | I | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| External entities | X | X | ||||
| Processes/Services | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Data stores | X | X | X | |||
| Data flows | X | X | X | |||
| Trust boundaries | X | X | X |
Tools Reference
manage_threats(action="add", section="threats", values=THREAT)
Call manage_threats(action="describe", section="threats") first for the exact
contract.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 130 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 3cc004743cc8
phase-6-threat-identification is a skill published in the GitHub repository awslabs/threat-modeling-mcp-server (101 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 1,256 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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