Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to babywyrm/mcpnuke. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/babywyrm/mcpnuke/main/.cursor/skills/mcpnuke-add-patterns/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/babywyrm/mcpnukeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/babywyrm/mcpnuke/mcpnuke-add-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/babywyrm/mcpnuke/mcpnuke-add-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/babywyrm/mcpnuke/mcpnuke-add-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/babywyrm/mcpnuke/mcpnuke-add-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/babywyrm/mcpnuke/mcpnuke-add-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.00817 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00409 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00163 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00082 |
Grade A, and why
mcpnuke-add-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 100 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Add mcpnuke Patterns
Pattern Files
| File | Purpose | Used By |
|---|---|---|
mcpnuke/patterns/rules.py |
Static regex for metadata analysis | Static checks (injection, permissions, theft, etc.) |
mcpnuke/patterns/probes.py |
Probe payloads and response analysis | Behavioral checks (tool_probes, resource_poisoning) |
Adding Static Patterns
1. Define the pattern list in rules.py
YOUR_PATTERNS = [
r"pattern_one",
r"pattern_two",
]
Pattern guidelines:
- Use raw strings (
r"...") - Case-insensitive matching is done by the caller (
re.IGNORECASE) - Use
\s+for whitespace,\bfor word boundaries - Use
.{0,30}for bounded wildcards (not.*) - Test each pattern against both positive and negative examples
2. Add tests in tests/test_patterns.py
def test_your_patterns_match():
text = "String that should match"
matches = [p for p in YOUR_PATTERNS if re.search(p, text, re.IGNORECASE)]
assert len(matches) >= 1
def test_your_patterns_no_false_positive():
text = "Normal safe string"
matches = [p for p in YOUR_PATTERNS if re.search(p, text, re.IGNORECASE)]
assert len(matches) == 0
3. Run tests (TDD: write tests FIRST, then patterns)
Follow superpowers test-driven-development: write the test assertions before
adding patterns to rules.py. Watch them fail (RED), then add patterns (GREEN).
uv run pytest tests/test_patterns.py -v
Adding Probe Payloads
In probes.py
Injection probes (sent to tools):
YOUR_PROBES = [
f"payload_with_{CANARY}",
"payload_two",
]
Response analysis patterns (checked in tool output):
YOUR_RESPONSE_PATTERNS = [
r"pattern_to_find_in_responses",
]
Rules:
- Probes should be safe — they test for vuln without causing damage
- Use the
CANARYstring (MCP_PROBE_8f4c2a) to detect reflection - Response patterns use the same regex conventions as
rules.py
Existing Pattern Sets (reference)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 100 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A 2326e8464ca4
mcpnuke-add-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository babywyrm/mcpnuke (2 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 817 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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