Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit --skill secrets-scangit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/secrets-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/secrets-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/secrets-scan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/secrets-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/secrets-scan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 9 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 166 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 410 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 256 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 268 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 4 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 237 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 264 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.05594 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.02238 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.01119 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00559 |
Grade A, and why
secrets-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 450 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/secrets-scan Workflow
Output Rules
- Always print full absolute paths for all artifact references (plan files, review files, audit logs). This makes paths clickable in terminals like Warp. Use the resolved
$PLANS_DIRvalue, never relative paths.
Role
This skill is a pipeline coordinator. It orchestrates a sequential secrets detection workflow using pattern-based scanning. It delegates grep/regex scanning to Bash and synthesis to analysis tasks. It does NOT require external tools like trufflehog or gitleaks — all scanning uses built-in grep patterns, making it self-contained and deployable anywhere Claude Code runs.
Zero tolerance policy: Any confirmed secret detected results in a BLOCKED verdict. There is no passing threshold — secrets in code are a critical finding.
Report redaction rule: This skill NEVER includes actual secret values in reports. Reports show secret type, file path, and line number only. Pattern matches are redacted to show type and location: e.g., "AWS Access Key at src/config.js:42".
Inputs
- Scan scope: $ARGUMENTS
staged(default) — scan git staged files only (pre-commit gate)all— scan entire working directoryhistory— scan git commit history (use for post-incident review)
Step 0 — Pre-flight checks
Resolve devkit paths (MUST be first action in Step 0):
Tool: Bash
# --- Devkit Path Resolution ---
DEVKIT_SCRIPTS="${CLAUDE_DEVKIT:-$HOME/.claude-devkit}/scripts"
# Source path resolution helper
if [ -f "$DEVKIT_SCRIPTS/resolve-project-dir.sh" ]; then
. "$DEVKIT_SCRIPTS/resolve-project-dir.sh"
DEVKIT_PROJECT_DIR_RESOLVED=$(resolve_devkit_project_dir) || {
echo "Failed to resolve project directory" >&2; exit 1
}
elif [ -n "${DEVKIT_PROJECT_DIR:-}" ]; then
DEVKIT_PROJECT_DIR_RESOLVED="$DEVKIT_PROJECT_DIR"
else
echo "WARNING: devkit is not installed. Using deprecated .devkit/ fallback." >&2
DEVKIT_PROJECT_DIR_RESOLVED=".devkit"
fi
PLANS_DIR="$DEVKIT_PROJECT_DIR_RESOLVED/plans"
mkdir -p "$PLANS_DIR"
echo "Plans directory: $PLANS_DIR"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 450 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A c9bab3fb32a7
secrets-scan is a skill published in the GitHub repository backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit (15 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 5,594 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
publish-pr
Use in /implement at the draft→ready boundary to squash the branch's review-iteration commits into one (non-interactive soft-reset + recommit + force-with-lease) and mark the draft PR ready. Takes the commit message as input (sourced from the plan-file before cleanup). GitHub-specific (gh) behind a host-neutral…
pr-squash-message
Generate one short Conventional Commits squash message describing only the net diff between the PR's base and head, set its header as the PR title, validate it with the repository's commitlint and both copy its description to the clipboard and display it, when asked for a squash message. Works in any Scenario…
git-workflow
Guided git workflows: prepare PRs, clean up branches, resolve merge conflicts, handle monorepo tags, squash-and-merge patterns. Use when asked to prepare a PR, clean branches, resolve conflicts, or tag a release.
phx-pr-review
Address feedback left on a GitHub pull request: fetch unresolved review threads, make agreed Elixir/Phoenix code fixes, reply, and resolve. Use for a PR URL/number or reviewer comments. NOT for pre-PR review, findings triage, or CI monitoring.
branch-and-worktree-workflow
Isolates feature work in its own branch or worktree and integrates it cleanly when done. Use this when starting work that should not disturb the current workspace, when several efforts must proceed in parallel on one repository, or when implementation is finished and the change needs merging, rebasing, or splitting…
private-secret-scanning
Local Gitleaks scans for staged changes, push ranges, and full history in private repos, with redacted reports. Use to block committed secrets without GitHub Secret Protection.