attack-path-analysis

Security Attack Path Analysis

Objective

Turn validated or still-plausible findings into explicit attacker stories, structured attack-path analysis facts, severity calibration, and a final reportability decision grounded in the threat model.

Artifact Resolution

The path references in this skill are the default locations for this phase. If the user explicitly provides a different path for a required input or output, use the user-provided path instead of the corresponding default path referenced in this skill. If a required input is still missing, stop and ask the user for it before continuing. Use the shared scan artifact path conventions in ../../references/scan-artifacts.md.

Standard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.

Compact Workbench-Backed Diff Mode

When a workbench-backed $security-diff-scan has a scanId, load the per-scan threat model and read the validated candidates with list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? }). Analyze every reportable or deferred candidate, preserve every discovery and validation field and the original candidate order, and submit all decisions together with one record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] }) call. Submit attackPaths: [] when no candidate enters this phase. The existing tool atomically updates the stored candidates; do not create per-finding reports, receipts, or manual candidate ledgers in this compact diff mode. Keep attack-path facts, counterevidence, severity calibration, and policy adjustment as separate reasoning steps. Other scan and standalone workflows retain their existing artifact behavior.

Workflow

1. Load the per-scan threat model path from ../../references/scan-artifacts.md as the repo-specific threat-model source of truth. Start from this along with the potential findings. Both inputs are required for this workflow.
   • For repository-wide and scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked reportable or survives: yes even if they were not assigned polished candidate numbers during discovery.
2. Determine whether the affected code is in scope for the repository threat model and whether it belongs to a product surface or production workflow.
3. Build a factual attack path using repository evidence only:
   • service mapping
   • exposure and entry points
   • identity, privilege, and trust boundaries
   • secrets handling and sensitive-data flow
   • reachability
   • existing controls and mitigations
4. Before finalizing scope or reportability-driving facts, identify the strongest repository counterevidence against the key scoping fields and explain why it is or is not dispositive.
5. Calibrate impact and likelihood from the repository evidence.
6. Apply a separate final policy-adjustment pass mechanically using those facts and the calibrated severity.
7. Record final policy decision ignore explicitly; in compact diff mode, retain its candidate record for coverage, and otherwise drop it from the surviving finding set.
8. For a durable diff scan, submit the nested decision for every eligible candidate in the single compact tool call. Otherwise, save that finding's visible attack-path report and append one attack-path receipt per candidate id at the default paths from ../../references/scan-artifacts.md. The receipt must record the candidate id, attack-path reportability decision, attack-path facts or exact proof gap, and attack-path artifact/report reference for that candidate finding.