security-audit

security-audit is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from blueberrycongee/termcanvas. It costs 62 tokens per session (885 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A structured security check for software that handles outside input, accounts, secrets, or external data. It examines common attack risks using categories such as OWASP and STRIDE.

In plain words
What is it for?
Reviewing web endpoints, command-line inputs, uploads, authentication, authorization, sessions, database queries, file paths, and other trust boundaries.
Why use it?
It helps find weaknesses such as unsafe input handling, missing access checks, exposed secrets, or insecure sessions before attackers exploit them.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Part of the skills plugin — 7 skills, 1 hook shipped together

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/blueberrycongee/termcanvas/security-audit
Any agent
npx skills add blueberrycongee/termcanvas --skill security-audit
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/blueberrycongee/termcanvas

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Or install skills, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 7 skills, 1 hook.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for security-audit

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/blueberrycongee/termcanvas/security-audit.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/blueberrycongee/termcanvas/security-audit)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/blueberrycongee/termcanvas/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/blueberrycongee/termcanvas/security-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 62 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 885 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00062 $0.00885
Opus 5 $0.00031 $0.00443
Sonnet 5 $0.00012 $0.00177
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00089

Measured 4d ago against content hash 32ce051730bd, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/skills/security-audit/SKILL.md · 95 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 95 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Security Audit

Phased security scan. Each phase is independent — skip phases that do not apply to the codebase.

Phase 1: Scope

  1. Identify the attack surface: what accepts external input? (HTTP endpoints, CLI args, file uploads, WebSocket messages, IPC, environment variables)
  2. Identify trust boundaries: where does data cross from untrusted to trusted?
  3. List authentication and authorization mechanisms in use
  4. Note the deployment model (server, serverless, desktop, CLI)

Phase 2: Input Validation

For each entry point identified in Phase 1:

  • Is user input validated and sanitized before use?
  • Are SQL queries parameterized (not string-interpolated)?
  • Is HTML output escaped to prevent XSS?
  • Are file paths validated to prevent path traversal?
  • Are file uploads constrained by type and size?
  • Is deserialization of untrusted data avoided or sandboxed?

Phase 3: Auth and Session

  • Are all protected routes/endpoints checked for authentication?
  • Is authorization checked per-resource, not just per-route?
  • Are session tokens generated with sufficient entropy?
  • Are tokens stored securely (httpOnly, secure, sameSite)?
  • Is there rate limiting on login/auth endpoints?
  • Are password reset flows safe from enumeration?

Phase 4: Secrets

  1. grep -r for common secret patterns in source (API keys, tokens, passwords, connection strings) — exclude node_modules, .git, lock files
  2. Check git log --all -p -S "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" for secrets that were committed and later removed (they are still in history)
  3. Verify .gitignore covers .env, credential files, and key material
  4. Check that secrets are not logged, included in error responses, or exposed in client-side bundles

Phase 5: Dependencies

  1. Check for known vulnerabilities: npm audit / pip audit / equivalent
  2. Look for unmaintained dependencies (no updates in 2+ years)
  3. Check that lockfiles are committed and dependencies are pinned

Phase 6: CI/CD

If CI/CD config exists (.github/workflows/, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.):

Read the full file on GitHub · 95 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 4d ago First seen · 95 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A 32ce051730bd

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository blueberrycongee/termcanvas (393 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 885 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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