Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills --skill triage-access-deniedgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bregman-arie/devops-sre-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills/triage-access-denied)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills/triage-access-denied"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills/triage-access-denied/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills/triage-access-denied"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills/triage-access-denied.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.00497 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00249 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00099 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00050 |
Grade A, and why
Triage AWS AccessDenied scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
When to use
Use when you receive AccessDenied, UnauthorizedOperation, or not authorized to perform errors.
Preconditions
- You can access the AWS account with permission to inspect IAM and CloudTrail.
- You can identify the failing action and, ideally, the principal and resource.
Procedure
- Capture the failing API action, resource, region, and principal (role/user).
- Look up the corresponding CloudTrail event (or application logs) for context.
- Identify which policy types apply: identity policy, resource policy, permission boundary, SCP, session policy.
- Use policy simulation to confirm the explicit deny/implicit deny.
- Propose the narrowest change that grants access.
Decision points
- Explicit Deny in any layer: must remove/override deny (cannot be allowed elsewhere).
- SCP denies: change must happen at org/OU level.
- Resource policy missing principal: update resource policy rather than identity.
- Permission boundary blocks: adjust boundary or use a different role.
Verification
- Re-run the exact API call and confirm success.
- Confirm no broader permissions were granted than necessary.
Rollback / undo
- Revert the policy change to the prior version.
- Detach any temporary policies used for debugging.
Escalation
- Security/IAM owners for SCP/boundary changes.
- Service owners for resource policy changes on shared resources.
Examples
Action: s3:GetObject
Resource: arn:aws:s3:::<bucket>/<key>
Principal: arn:aws:sts::<account>:assumed-role/<role>/<session>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 71 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A 3b62b4460d2f
Triage AWS AccessDenied is a skill published in the GitHub repository bregman-arie/devops-sre-skills (22 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 497 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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