Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills --skill agentic-security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/browoz/agentic-sdlc-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills/agentic-security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills/agentic-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills/agentic-security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills/agentic-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills/agentic-security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00106 | $0.00546 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00042 | $0.00218 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00109 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00055 |
Grade A, and why
agentic-security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Agentic Security Review
Use this skill to find security risks introduced by agentic code, AI-generated changes, tool access, or untrusted context. Scope the review before scanning.
Workflow
- Determine scope:
deps-only: package declarations, lockfiles, imports.code-only: secrets, auth, input handling, injection risks.full: dependencies, code, tools, memory, context, red-team cases.
- Classify rigor:
- Prototype: dependency and secret checks.
- Internal: dependency, secret, input validation, and tool permission checks.
- Production: full review plus context poisoning, CaMeL-style separation decision, red-team scenarios, and release blockers.
- Run
scripts/check_deps.py <project-root>when Python files are present. - Fill
SECURITY_REVIEW.mdfromassets/templates/SECURITY_REVIEW.md. - Mark findings with severity, evidence, file path, and concrete fix.
- Block release only for exploitable or high-impact issues; otherwise provide prioritized remediation.
Focus Areas
- Dependencies: undeclared imports, unpinned direct dependencies, missing lockfile, suspicious package names.
- Tools: shadowing, broad credentials, unsafe side effects, unclear provenance.
- Code: CWE-20, CWE-78, CWE-89, CWE-327, hardcoded secrets, weak auth.
- Context: prompt injection through external data, memory poisoning, unsafe tool responses, mixed trusted/untrusted data.
References
Read ../agentic-engineering-sdlc/references/day2_tools_and_interop.md for
tool risks and ../agentic-engineering-sdlc/references/day4_security_and_evaluation.md
for security/evaluation depth.
Done Criteria
- Scope, rigor, and exclusions are documented.
- Script output is attached or summarized when applicable.
- Release blockers are separated from hardening recommendations.
- Every high/critical finding has a reproduction path or clear evidence.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 56 lines · 106 tokens per session scan A 8e6ad15d8ea8
agentic-security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository browoz/agentic-sdlc-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 106 tokens to every session and 546 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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