Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add canonical/charm-tech --skill gha-security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/canonical/charm-techWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/canonical/charm-tech/gha-security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/canonical/charm-tech/gha-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/canonical/charm-tech/gha-security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/canonical/charm-tech/gha-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/canonical/charm-tech/gha-security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00076 | $0.01903 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00038 | $0.00951 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00381 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
gha-security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
89% identical to gha-security-review — 15 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 190 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub Actions Security Review
Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.
This skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI/CD theory.
Scope
Review the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.
Files to Review
.github/workflows/*.yml— all workflow definitionsaction.yml/action.yaml— composite actions in the repo.github/actions/*/action.yml— local reusable actions- Config files loaded by workflows:
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,Makefile, shell scripts under.github/
Out of Scope
- Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)
- GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)
Threat Model
Only report vulnerabilities exploitable by an external attacker — someone without write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger workflow_dispatch, or trigger manual workflows.
Do not flag vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:
workflow_dispatchinput injection — requires write access to trigger- Expression injection in
push-only workflows on protected branches workflow_callinput injection where all callers are internal- Secrets in
workflow_dispatch/schedule-only workflows
Confidence
Report only HIGH and MEDIUM confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.
| Confidence | Criteria | Action |
|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Traced the full attack path, confirmed exploitable | Report with exploitation scenario and fix |
| MEDIUM | Attack path partially confirmed, uncertain link | Report as needs verification |
| LOW | Theoretical or mitigated elsewhere | Do not report |
What ships with it
9 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/ai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md 5.3 KB
- references/comment-triggered-commands.md 5.5 KB
- references/credential-escalation.md 6.5 KB
- references/expression-injection.md 8.5 KB
- references/permissions-and-secrets.md 7.7 KB
- references/pwn-request.md 5.8 KB
- references/real-world-attacks.md 9.3 KB
- references/runner-infrastructure.md 7.8 KB
- references/supply-chain.md 5.9 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 190 lines · 76 tokens per session scan A b7b99cb80d88
gha-security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository canonical/charm-tech (2 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 76 tokens to every session and 1,903 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 89% identical to gha-security-review, differing in 15 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
import-prom-rule
Bulk import of a Prometheus alert rule YAML file (create a whole set of rules at once). Dedicated to handling a remote URL or local YAML text, automatically parsing the three formats groups / a plain rules array / a single rule. ⚠️ Do not use this skill for single-rule creation — when the user describes a single alert…
chinese-git-workflow
A reference for configuring Git with Chinese code-hosting services such as Gitee, Coding.net, GitLab China, and CNB, including SSH, HTTPS, credentials, CI, and repository mirroring.
configure-env-variables
Configures environment variables for Power Pages site settings to support ALM across environments. Creates environment variable definitions in Dataverse, guides the user through linking site settings to those variables via the Power Pages Management app, adds the variables to the solution, and generates a…
atmos-profiles
Atmos profiles: profile directories, --profile and ATMOSPROFILE activation, profile merge behavior, environment switching, and routing profile-specific auth/toolchain/config overrides.
webhook-management
Configure and validate CCAM webhook targets across supported chat, incident, automation, and generic providers. Use when listing provider requirements, creating or updating a target, scoping it to alert rules, sending a test notification, reviewing delivery history, or deleting a target.
monorepo-management
Master monorepo management with Turborepo, Nx, and pnpm workspaces to build efficient, scalable multi-package repositories with optimized builds and dependency management. Use when setting up monorepos, optimizing builds, or managing shared dependencies.