Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails --skill docker-safetygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrailsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails/docker-safety)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails/docker-safety"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails/docker-safety/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails/docker-safety"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails/docker-safety.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00114 | $0.04322 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00057 | $0.02161 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00864 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00432 |
Grade D, and why
docker-safety scanned grade D with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
### Rule 2 — Non-root `USER` is mandatory; no images run as root Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
(`rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` for apt, `apk --no-cache` for apk, Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y python3 curl How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 476 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Why
A Docker image and its run command together define the security posture
of every workload they produce. The same image can ship as a hardened,
non-root, read-only filesystem service — or as a root-owned container
with the host's /var/run/docker.sock mounted in, one docker exec
away from a host takeover.
The failures this skill blocks share a common shape: a single line in
a Dockerfile, a docker-compose.yml, or a docker run flag that
breaks the isolation boundary the container is supposed to provide.
FROM node:latestships a moving target. The same Dockerfile builds a different image week to week, and a CVE fixed upstream silently re-enters when the tag floats backward.- A container running as
roothas UID 0 on the host's kernel namespace. With certain capabilities or a misconfigured runtime, a container compromise becomes a host compromise. ENV API_KEY=sk_live_...writes the secret into a layer that lives in the image's history forever — pushed to every registry the image is pushed to, pulled to every host that runs it.--privilegeddisables every capability filter, seccomp profile, and AppArmor profile the runtime would otherwise apply. The container is effectively a process running on the host with containment-as-suggestion.--net=hostshares the host's network namespace, so the container can bind to host ports, reach host services on127.0.0.1, and receive traffic intended for the host. Combined with a vulnerable service in the container, this is a direct path to LAN exposure.- A bind-mount of
/or/var/run/docker.sockfrom the host into the container hands the container read/write access to the host filesystem or the host's Docker daemon. Either is escape-class.
This skill applies the same query-then-modify discipline used elsewhere in the bundle: non-root by default, immutable by default, no secrets at build time, no host-namespace sharing.
When to apply
Apply this skill before the agent writes, recommends, or commits any of the following:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 476 lines · 114 tokens per session scan D 24656937f2d4
docker-safety is a skill published in the GitHub repository catpilotai/catpilot-ai-guardrails (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 114 tokens to every session and 4,322 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 3 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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