Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenix/elixir-phoenix-securitynpx skills add ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenix --skill elixir-phoenix-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenix/elixir-phoenix-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenix/elixir-phoenix-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenix/elixir-phoenix-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00873 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00436 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00175 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00087 |
Grade A, and why
elixir-phoenix-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 104 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Elixir/Phoenix Security Reference
Quick reference for security patterns in Elixir/Phoenix.
Iron Laws — Never Violate These
- VALIDATE AT BOUNDARIES — Never trust client input. All data through changesets
- NEVER INTERPOLATE USER INPUT — Use Ecto's
^operator, never string interpolation - NO String.to_atom WITH USER INPUT — Atom exhaustion DoS. Use
to_existing_atom/1 - AUTHORIZE EVERYWHERE — Check in contexts AND re-validate in LiveView events
- ESCAPE BY DEFAULT — Never use
raw/1with untrusted content - SECRETS NEVER IN CODE — All secrets in
runtime.exsfrom env vars
Quick Patterns
Timing-Safe Authentication
def authenticate(email, password) do
user = Repo.get_by(User, email: email)
cond do
user && Argon2.verify_pass(password, user.hashed_password) ->
{:ok, user}
user ->
{:error, :invalid_credentials}
true ->
Argon2.no_user_verify() # Timing attack prevention
{:error, :invalid_credentials}
end
end
LiveView Authorization (CRITICAL)
# RE-AUTHORIZE IN EVERY EVENT HANDLER
def handle_event("delete", %{"id" => id}, socket) do
post = Blog.get_post!(id)
# Don't trust that mount authorized this action!
with :ok <- Bodyguard.permit(Blog, :delete_post, socket.assigns.current_user, post) do
Blog.delete_post(post)
{:noreply, stream_delete(socket, :posts, post)}
else
_ -> {:noreply, put_flash(socket, :error, "Unauthorized")}
end
end
SQL Injection Prevention
# ✅ SAFE: Parameterized queries
from(u in User, where: u.name == ^user_input)
# ❌ VULNERABLE: String interpolation
from(u in User, where: fragment("name = '#{user_input}'"))
Quick Decisions
What to validate?
- All user input → Ecto changesets
- File uploads → Extension + magic bytes + size
- Paths →
Path.safe_relative/2for traversal - Atoms →
String.to_existing_atom/1only
What to escape?
- HTML output → Auto-escaped by default (
<%= %>) - User HTML → HtmlSanitizeEx with scrubber
- Never →
raw/1with untrusted content
What ships with it
8 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 104 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A 5384a2f4b727
elixir-phoenix-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository ccarvalho-eng/codex-elixir-phoenix (11 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 873 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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