denial-of-service

denial-of-service is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from ccashwell/evm-cortex. It costs 55 tokens per session (1,579 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A Solidity security guide for preventing denial-of-service attacks, where an attacker makes a blockchain contract too expensive or impossible to run.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when designing loops, batch operations, withdrawals, reward payments, or any contract that processes user-controlled data.
Why use it?
It helps avoid unbounded loops, gas-limit failures, griefing, and unsafe ways of sending Ether that can stop users from completing transactions.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Use it when designing loops, batch operations, withdrawals, reward payments, or any contract that processes user-controlled data.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add ccashwell/evm-cortex --skill denial-of-service
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ccashwell/evm-cortex

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for denial-of-service

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for denial-of-service

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/denial-of-service.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 55 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,579 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector pass 7 Sept 2026
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00055 $0.01579
Opus 5.5 $0.00022 $0.00632
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00011 $0.00316
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00158

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 9c2013bb8ae6, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

denial-of-service scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/denial-of-service/SKILL.md · 224 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 224 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Denial of Service

Unbounded Loops Over Dynamic Arrays

Iterating over arrays that grow with user interaction will eventually exceed the block gas limit.

// VULNERABLE: array grows unboundedly
address[] public stakers;

function distributeRewards() external {
    // If stakers.length > ~1500, this exceeds block gas limit
    for (uint256 i; i < stakers.length; ++i) {
        _sendReward(stakers[i]);
    }
}

Defense: Pull Pattern

// Users claim their own rewards — no unbounded iteration
mapping(address => uint256) public pendingRewards;

function claimReward() external {
    uint256 amount = pendingRewards[msg.sender];
    if (amount == 0) revert NothingToClaim();

    pendingRewards[msg.sender] = 0;

    (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");
    if (!success) revert TransferFailed();

    emit RewardClaimed(msg.sender, amount);
}

Defense: Paginated Processing

uint256 public lastProcessedIndex;

function distributeRewards(uint256 batchSize) external {
    uint256 end = lastProcessedIndex + batchSize;
    if (end > stakers.length) end = stakers.length;

    for (uint256 i = lastProcessedIndex; i < end;) {
        _sendReward(stakers[i]);
        unchecked { ++i; }
    }

    lastProcessedIndex = end;

    if (end == stakers.length) {
        lastProcessedIndex = 0; // reset for next round
        emit DistributionComplete();
    }
}

External Call Failures Blocking Execution

A single failing external call in a loop blocks all subsequent operations.

// VULNERABLE: one failed transfer blocks all
function distributeAll(address[] calldata recipients, uint256[] calldata amounts) external {
    for (uint256 i; i < recipients.length; ++i) {
        IERC20(token).safeTransfer(recipients[i], amounts[i]); // if one reverts, all fail
    }
}

// FIXED: record failures, continue processing
function distributeAll(address[] calldata recipients, uint256[] calldata amounts) external {
    for (uint256 i; i < recipients.length;) {
        try IERC20(token).transfer(recipients[i], amounts[i]) returns (bool success) {
            if (!success) {
                pendingClaims[recipients[i]] += amounts[i];
                emit DistributionFailed(recipients[i], amounts[i]);
            }
        } catch {
            pendingClaims[recipients[i]] += amounts[i];
            emit DistributionFailed(recipients[i], amounts[i]);
        }
        unchecked { ++i; }
    }
}

Read the full file on GitHub · 224 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 224 lines · 55 tokens per session scan A 9c2013bb8ae6

Subscribe to this mod's changes

denial-of-service is a skill published in the GitHub repository ccashwell/evm-cortex (131 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 1,579 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.