Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to ccevans/bobbycode. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ccevans/bobbycode/main/.claude/skills/bobby-security/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ccevans/bobbycodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccevans/bobbycode/bobby-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccevans/bobbycode/bobby-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccevans/bobbycode/bobby-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccevans/bobbycode/bobby-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccevans/bobbycode/bobby-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.01640 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00820 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00328 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00164 |
Grade A, and why
security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 154 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Bobby Security Skill
Security audit using OWASP Top 10 and STRIDE threat modeling. Reviews changed code for vulnerabilities with concrete exploit scenarios.
Before Starting
- Check learnings — Read
.claude/skills/bobby-security/learnings.md+.claude/skills/bobby-security/learnings.local.md - Run
git log --oneline -10to understand what changed - Read the ticket's
ticket.mdandplan.mdfor context
Investigation First
<investigation_rules> Before forming any security opinion:
- Read every file that was changed:
git diff --name-only - For each changed file, understand the data flow: where does user input enter, how is it processed, where does it exit?
- Read adjacent files that handle auth, validation, or data access if the changed code interacts with them
- Do not flag issues in code that was not changed by this ticket unless it's a critical vulnerability the change exposed </investigation_rules>
OWASP Top 10 Checklist
For each changed file, check:
Injection (A03:2021)
- SQL queries use parameterized queries / prepared statements (never string concatenation)
- Shell commands use argument arrays, not string interpolation
- LDAP, XPath, NoSQL queries are parameterized
- ORM queries don't use raw SQL with user input
Broken Access Control (A01:2021)
- API endpoints verify user authorization (not just authentication)
- Direct object references (IDs in URLs) are validated against the user's permissions
- Server-side access control cannot be bypassed by manipulating client-side state
- Admin functions are protected by role checks
Cryptographic Failures (A02:2021)
- Passwords are hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (never MD5/SHA1)
- Sensitive data is not logged or exposed in error messages
- API keys and secrets are not hardcoded
- HTTPS is used for all external communication
Security Misconfiguration (A05:2021)
- Error pages don't expose stack traces or internal details
- Default credentials are not present
- CORS is configured restrictively (not
*) - Security headers are present (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 154 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A ff3cacffcb2a
security-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository ccevans/bobbycode (6 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 1,640 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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