Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add chadixearth/graphyloop --skill frontend-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/chadixearth/graphyloopWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/chadixearth/graphyloop/frontend-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/chadixearth/graphyloop/frontend-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/chadixearth/graphyloop/frontend-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/chadixearth/graphyloop/frontend-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/chadixearth/graphyloop/frontend-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00080 | $0.01857 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.00743 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00371 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00186 |
Grade A, and why
frontend-security scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sI https://host/ | grep -iE 'content-security-policy|x-frame|x-content-type|referrer|strict-transport|permissions-policy' How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 129 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Frontend security
Server-side review misses the frontend because the frontend "has no secrets" — and
then a service-role key ships in a NEXT_PUBLIC_* var, a markdown renderer writes
raw HTML into the DOM, and an access token sits in localStorage where any
injected script can read it. This skill is the client-side pass: the sinks, the
storage, the headers, and what to verify before calling it done.
When to activate
- Rendering anything a user or an API supplied (HTML, markdown, SVG, URLs, filenames).
- Auth in the browser: login, logout, token refresh, "remember me", role-based UI.
- Adding an env var, an analytics/chat/payment script, an iframe, or a
postMessagechannel. - Reviewing a PR that touches any of the above, or a "make it work in the browser" fix.
The five checks, in order
- Secrets — no key that grants privilege may reach the bundle.
- Sinks — every place a string becomes markup, a URL, or code.
- Token storage — where credentials live between requests.
- Headers — CSP and friends, set where the app is actually served from.
- Third-party — scripts, iframes, and messages you did not write.
1. Secrets in the bundle
- A var is public the moment its name is prefixed (
NEXT_PUBLIC_,VITE_,PUBLIC_,REACT_APP_,EXPO_PUBLIC_) or referenced from a client component. Prefixing a server key does not make it safe — it publishes it. - Never prefix: service-role keys, admin/API secrets, webhook signing secrets,
SMTP or DB credentials, private OAuth client secrets. See
secrets-hygiene. - Grep before shipping:
NEXT_PUBLIC_.*(SERVICE|SECRET|PRIVATE|ADMIN|TOKEN|PASSWORD), and search the built output (.next/static,dist/assets) for the last 8 characters of any server key you hold. A hit in the build is a leak, not a warning. - Anything the browser can call, an attacker can call with the same key. If a key must stay secret, the call belongs in a route handler / server action / edge function, and the client calls that.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 129 lines · 80 tokens per session scan A 9a7522f21fcb
frontend-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository chadixearth/graphyloop (3 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 1,857 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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