Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill --skill grad-auction-theorygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill/grad-auction-theory)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill/grad-auction-theory"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill/grad-auction-theory/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill/grad-auction-theory"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill/grad-auction-theory.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00062 | $0.01152 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00031 | $0.00576 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00230 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00115 |
Grade A, and why
"grad-auction-theory" scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
92% identical to grad-auction-theory — 8 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 100 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auction Theory: Four Canonical Formats and Revenue Equivalence
Overview
Auction theory analyzes strategic bidding behavior across different selling mechanisms. The four canonical formats — English (ascending), Dutch (descending), first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) — generate identical expected revenue under standard assumptions. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) is the central benchmark; deviations from its assumptions drive all practical auction design decisions.
When to Use
- Choosing among auction formats for selling goods, spectrum, procurement, or ad slots
- Analyzing bidder strategy (bid shading, sniping, jump bidding) under a specific format
- Evaluating whether a proposed auction achieves optimal revenue or efficiency
When NOT to Use
- Posted-price or negotiated sales where no competitive bidding occurs
- Multi-unit auctions with complex complementarities (use combinatorial auction frameworks)
- The seller has no commitment power to enforce auction rules
Assumptions
IRON LAW: Revenue equivalence holds ONLY with risk-neutral bidders,
independent private values (IPV), and symmetric bidders — violate ANY
assumption and auction format matters.
- Single indivisible object for sale
- Bidders are risk-neutral expected-utility maximizers
- Values are independently and identically distributed (IPV)
- Bidders are symmetric (same distribution of values)
- Payment is a function of bids only (no externalities)
Methodology
Step 1 — Identify the Value Model Classify the setting: independent private values (IPV), common values, or affiliated values. IPV means each bidder knows their own value with certainty; common values mean the object has one true value unknown to all; affiliated values generalize both.
Step 2 — Derive Equilibrium Bidding Strategies For each auction format, solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In second-price / English auctions under IPV, bidding true value is dominant. In first-price / Dutch auctions, bidders shade below true value: b(v) = E[Y1 | Y1 < v] where Y1 is the highest competing value.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 100 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A 4469aa6d9654
"grad-auction-theory" is a skill published in the GitHub repository charlieviettq/awesome-agent-skill (26 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 1,152 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 92% identical to grad-auction-theory, differing in 8 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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