Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ChianW/C31 --skill c31-review-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ChianW/C31Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/chianw/c31/c31-review-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/chianw/c31/c31-review-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/chianw/c31/c31-review-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/chianw/c31/c31-review-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/chianw/c31/c31-review-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.00752 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00301 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00150 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00075 |
Grade A, and why
C31-review-security scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- `confidence`: 100 = I can write a curl to exploit this; 75 = clear vulnerable pattern; 50 = plausible with specific input; 25 = suspicious but unlikely. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 83 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Multilingual Triggers
| Language | Trigger phrases |
|---|---|
| EN | C31-review-security |
| ZH | 安全审查, 安全检查 |
| JA | セキュリティレビュー, 脆弱性チェック |
Output language: Respond automatically in the user's conversation language.
C31 Review — Security
Focus
- Injection (SQL, NoSQL, command, template, LDAP)
- XSS / CSP bypasses / unsafe HTML construction
- Auth bypass / privilege escalation / missing ownership checks
- Secrets in code or logs (tokens, passwords, keys)
- Insecure deserialization / unsafe eval
- Missing rate limiting / brute-force exposure
- CORS misconfiguration / unsafe headers
- Data exposure (PII leak, over-fetching, missing field-level auth)
Severity Calibration
| Level | Meaning | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| P0 | Direct exploit, data breach, auth bypass | SQL injection in public endpoint |
| P1 | Elevated privilege or significant data leak | Missing ownership check on delete |
| P2 | Defense-in-depth gap, narrow exploit window | No rate limit on login |
| P3 | Logging of sensitive data, minor header issue | Password logged in error message |
Workflow
- Read the intent summary and diff.
- For each endpoint, handler, or input boundary touched:
- Identify all user-supplied input (query params, body, headers, path segments).
- Check if input reaches a query builder, shell, template, or eval.
- Check auth guards: is ownership verified? Is the check on the right layer?
- Check output construction: is user input reflected in HTML/JSON without escaping?
- Check for secrets in strings, config, or logs.
- Flag any exploitable path or defense gap.
JSON Output Contract
Return exactly one JSON object:
{
"reviewer": "security",
"findings": [
{
"title": "One-line description",
"severity": "P0|P1|P2|P3",
"file": "relative/path",
"line": 42,
"confidence": 0|25|50|75|100,
"autofix_class": "safe_auto|gated_auto|manual|advisory",
"owner": "review-fixer|downstream-resolver|human",
"requires_verification": true|false,
"pre_existing": true|false,
"suggested_fix": "If known, brief fix description"
}
],
"residual_risks": ["Architecture-level risk 1"],
"testing_gaps": ["Missing security test for auth bypass"]
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 83 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A 59367ef81dd0
C31-review-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository ChianW/C31 (1 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 752 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
github-pr-workflow
Prepare a GitHub pull request from a feature branch — branch hygiene, commit shape, title/body, verification notes, screenshots for UI work, and replies to review comments.
agent-code-review-swarm
Agent skill for code-review-swarm - invoke with $agent-code-review-swarm.
agent-swarm-pr
Agent skill for swarm-pr - invoke with $agent-swarm-pr.
agent-pr-manager
Agent skill for pr-manager - invoke with $agent-pr-manager.
agent-reviewer
Agent skill for reviewer - invoke with $agent-reviewer.
agent-analyze-code-quality
Agent skill for analyze-code-quality - invoke with $agent-analyze-code-quality.