Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Cognisn/cloudledger --skill tool-guidegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Cognisn/cloudledgerWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cognisn/cloudledger/tool-guide)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cognisn/cloudledger/tool-guide"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cognisn/cloudledger/tool-guide/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cognisn/cloudledger/tool-guide"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cognisn/cloudledger/tool-guide.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.01084 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00030 | $0.00434 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00217 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
tool-guide scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 90 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Tool guide
The CloudLedger server exposes ~50 tools. This guide routes a question to
the right tool or specialised skill so you do not answer with the wrong data.
get_security_check_catalogue and the server's tool list are authoritative at
runtime; this guide is the map.
First: is there a task skill for this?
Prefer the specialised skill when the request matches one — it encodes the full workflow and the correct tool sequence:
| The user wants… | Use skill |
|---|---|
| A scored security assessment / report | security-assessment |
| What services/resources exist and how many | account-inventory |
| Cost breakdown, trends, or forecast | cost-analysis |
| A full security group audit and implications | security-groups-review |
| Attack paths / MITRE ATT&CK / "how could this be compromised" | attack-path-analysis |
If the request is a single focused lookup, go straight to the tool below.
The routing rules that prevent wrong answers
- Inventory / "how many X" → summary tools, never the findings tools.
Use
get_scan_summary(resource_counts) and the per-service summaries.get_security_assessment_dataandanalyze_service_exposurereturn findings only and will undercount resources badly. - A security score is never returned by the server. The tools return findings with advisory severities; scoring is done by the security-assessment skill's rubric.
- "None found" is not "unknown". A 0 count or a
not_applicablecheck means the account has none of that resource — state it as absent, not a gap. - Organizations cost questions →
get_organizations_cost_breakdown, notget_total_costalone, or the payer account looks like it dominates. - Default to the latest scan unless the user names a
scan_id; uselist_scans(acceptsaccount_number) to find a specific account's scan.
Tools by question
Scans and inventory
list_scans,get_scan_summary— which scans exist; per-scan resource counts.get_ec2_summary_by_account,get_lambda_summary,get_workspaces_summary— per-service counts and detail.compare_scans,get_ec2_changes,get_route53_changes— change over time.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 90 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 570f011d9a84
tool-guide is a skill published in the GitHub repository Cognisn/cloudledger (0 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 1,084 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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