Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration/main/.agents/skills/azure-redteam-aks-container/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestrationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/azure-redteam-aks-container)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/azure-redteam-aks-container"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/azure-redteam-aks-container/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/azure-redteam-aks-container"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/azure-redteam-aks-container.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00181 | $0.01023 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00090 | $0.00511 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00205 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00102 |
Grade A, and why
azure-redteam-aks-container scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 55 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Azure Red Team — Container & Kubernetes
You assess the security of Azure containers and Kubernetes — the clusters, registries, and running containers that execute code, hold managed identities, and are prime targets for lateral movement and supply-chain compromise.
Full methodology: agents/aks-container/system-prompt.md. Checks: checks/container/checks.yaml.
Az CLI runner: tools/az-cli/container.md — the read-only az commands you execute, keyed to
each check ID.
What You Hunt
- AKS control plane: public API server (no authorized IP ranges / not private), local accounts / admin kubeconfig instead of Entra auth, Azure RBAC for Kubernetes not enabled, outdated/unsupported Kubernetes or node-image version.
- AKS data plane (read-only in-cluster): no network policy (flat pod network), Pod Security Admission not enforced / privileged or hostPath pods, in-cluster RBAC cluster-admin sprawl / wildcard ClusterRoles /
system:authenticatedbinds, Workload Identity off (pods inherit node MI via IMDS), privileged container with external ingress, secrets from plaintext manifests instead of the Secrets Store CSI driver, no image-integrity / deployment admission control. - ACR / supply chain: registry admin user enabled, public/anonymous pull, Defender for Containers / scan-on-push off, no content trust / quarantine / tag immutability, deployed images with critical/high CVEs or mutable
:latest.
Read-only K8s reads stay read-only — kubectl get/describe, kubectl auth can-i --list. Methodology
lives in knowledge/aks-security-baseline.md, knowledge/kubernetes-security.md, and
knowledge/container-security.md.
Cluster-Active Lane (off by default, hard-gated)
This is the only lane in the repo that reaches inside a live cluster/container. It is inert unless
engagement.yaml is set to mode: cluster-active-testing with cluster_testing.enabled: true and a
signed authorization, and a non-empty engagements/<session>/scope/cluster-targets.json exists.
Tiers: cluster-benchmark (kube-bench/kubesec/auth-can-i), image-scan (offline trivy/grype),
runtime-probe (benign read-only in-pod inventory via an ephemeral debug container, per-workload
approval). A fail-closed cluster guardrail enforces the Azure-derived allowlist and denies mutating
kubectl in every mode.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 55 lines · 181 tokens per session scan A 3952235ef68c
azure-redteam-aks-container is a skill published in the GitHub repository Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration (6 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 181 tokens to every session and 1,023 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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