Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/controlplane-com/ai-plugin/access-controlnpx skills add controlplane-com/ai-plugin --skill access-controlgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/controlplane-com/ai-pluginWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00052 | $0.02962 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.01481 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00592 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00296 |
Grade A, and why
access-control scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 155 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Access Control & Policies — Primary Skill
Tool availability: some MCP tools named here live in the
fulltoolset profile — if one is not advertised on this connection, tell the user to reconnect the MCP server with?toolsets=full(or use thecplnCLI fallback). Reads work on every profile via the genericlist_resources/get_resourcetools;delete_resourceis on every profile exceptreadonly.
A policy targets one resource kind and binds permissions to principals (users, groups, service accounts, workload identities). The common failure is a policy that exists but grants nothing — a wrong targetKind, permission name, or principal link fails with no error — so read the policy back after writing.
The model
| Layer | Scope | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| Billing-account roles | account-wide (set on the billing account, separate from org policies) | billing_admin, billing_viewer, org_creator — none grant org-resource access |
| Org policies | per resource kind | all day-to-day access |
A caller is allowed an action when some policy on the resource's kind has a binding that lists that action (or a permission implying it) and names the caller — or a group the caller is in.
Policy anatomy
A policy = one targetKind + a target scope + bindings.
kind: policy
name: app-secret-access
targetKind: secret # exactly one resource kind
targetLinks: # OR `target: all` OR `targetQuery:` (pick one)
- //secret/database-url
bindings: # ≤ 50
- permissions: [reveal, use]
principalLinks: # 1–200
- //gvc/production/identity/app-identity
Limits: bindings ≤ 50; principalLinks 1–200 per binding; targetLinks ≤ 200. origin is read-only — default (yours) or builtin (locked; see Built-ins).
Target scope (pick one): target: all (org-wide roles) · targetLinks (specific resources) · targetQuery (tag query — see query-spec).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 155 lines · 52 tokens per session scan A d9559a23afe2
access-control is a skill published in the GitHub repository controlplane-com/ai-plugin (10 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 52 tokens to every session and 2,962 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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