Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add CraftOS-dev/CraftBot --skill supply-chain-risk-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/CraftOS-dev/CraftBotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/craftos-dev/craftbot/supply-chain-risk-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/craftos-dev/craftbot/supply-chain-risk-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/craftos-dev/craftbot/supply-chain-risk-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01174 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00587 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00235 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00117 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-risk-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
89% identical to supply-chain-risk-auditor — 28 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 63 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Risk Auditor
Activates when the user says "audit this project's dependencies".
When to Use
- Assessing dependency risk before a security audit
- Evaluating supply chain attack surface of a project
- Identifying unmaintained or risky dependencies
- Pre-engagement scoping for supply chain concerns
When NOT to Use
- Active vulnerability scanning (use dedicated tools like npm audit, pip-audit)
- Runtime dependency analysis
- License compliance auditing
Purpose
You systematically evaluate all dependencies of a project to identify red flags that indicate a high risk of exploitation or takeover. You generate a summary report noting these issues.
Risk Criteria
A dependency is considered high-risk if it features any of the following risk factors:
- Single maintainer or team of individuals - The project is primarily or solely maintained by a single individual, or a small number of individuals. The project is not managed by an organization such as the Linux Foundation or a company such as Microsoft. If the individual is an extremely prolific and well-known contributor to the ecosystem, such as
sindresorhusor Drew Devault, the risk is lessened but not eliminated. Conversely, if the individual is anonymous — that is, their GitHub identity is not readily tied to a real-world identity — the risk is significantly greater. Justification: If a developer is bribed or phished, they could unilaterally push malicious code. Consider the left-pad incident. - Unmaintained - The project is stale (no updates for a long period of time) or explicitly deprecated/archived. The maintainer may have put a note in the README.md or a GitHub issue that the project is inactive, understaffed, or seeking new maintainers. The project's GitHub repository may have a large number of issues noting bugs or security issues that the maintainers have not responded to. Feature request issues do NOT count. Justification: If vulnerabilities are identified in the project, they may not be patched in a timely manner.
- Low popularity: The project has a relatively low number of GitHub stars and/or downloads compared to other dependencies used by the target. Justification: Fewer users means fewer eyes on the project. If malicious code is introduced, it will not be noticed in a timely manner.
- High-risk features: The project implements features that by their nature are especially prone to exploitation, including FFI, deserialization, or third-party code execution. Justification: These dependencies are key to the target's security posture, and need to meet a high bar of scrutiny.
- Presence of past CVEs: The project has high or critical severity CVEs, especially a large number relative to its popularity and complexity. Justification: This is not necessarily an indicator of concern for extremely popular projects that are simply subject to more scrutiny and thus are the subject of more security research.
- Absence of a security contact: The project has no security contact listed in
.github/SECURITY.md,CONTRIBUTING.md,README.md, etc., or separately on the project's website (if one exists). Justification: Individuals who discover a vulnerability will have difficulty reporting it in a safe and timely manner.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 63 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 9f978cffec0a
supply-chain-risk-auditor is a skill published in the GitHub repository CraftOS-dev/CraftBot (380 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,174 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 89% identical to supply-chain-risk-auditor, differing in 28 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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