Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server --skill security-passgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-serverWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server/security-pass)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server/security-pass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server/security-pass/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server/security-pass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server/security-pass.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00118 | $0.05026 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.02513 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.01005 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00503 |
Grade A, and why
security-pass scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
**Smell:** `return { body: await fetch(url).then(r => r.text()) }` rendered directly in `format()`. Or: `description: \`Look up ${tenant.customLabel}\`` where `customLabel` is tenant-supplied. Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
grep -rnE "\b(exec|spawn|execSync|spawnSync)\b" src/ This is a copy
100% identical to security-pass — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 347 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Context
An MCP server is a new attack surface with unique properties — tool output feeds back into the LLM's context, scopes gate what the model can do on the user's behalf, and per-request state must stay tenant-scoped. This skill walks a server through eight axes shaped around what the server builder actually controls. Framework-level concerns (transport, JSON-RPC parsing, auto-correlation, error classification) are out of scope — mcp-ts-core handles those.
Read the code. Don't trust patterns from memory.
When to Use
- Before a release
- After adding or modifying a batch of handlers or services
- Periodically (quarterly-ish)
- User asks for a "security review", "audit", "hardening pass", or similar
Inputs
Gather before starting. Ask if unclear:
- Scope — whole server, specific module, or recent diff?
- Known concerns — anything the user already suspects?
- Deployment context — multi-tenant? public network? auth mode? (stdio / local-http / public-http behave differently)
- Severity floor — report all findings, or skip medium/low?
Steps
1. Build the map
Surface what you're auditing before diving in. Paths below assume the mcp-ts-core layout — adjust to your repo.
find src/mcp-server/tools/definitions -name "*.tool.ts" | sort
find src/mcp-server/resources/definitions -name "*.resource.ts" 2>/dev/null | sort
find src/mcp-server/prompts/definitions -name "*.prompt.ts" 2>/dev/null | sort
find src/services -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | sort
Note: tool / resource / prompt counts, auth mode, storage provider, upstream APIs, which tools have destructiveHint, which handlers request a consent round via ctx.requestInput, which services hold module-scope state, whether the server reads roots.
If transport is streamable HTTP or SSE, also capture:
- Bind address (
127.0.0.1for local, or0.0.0.0/ public interface?) - Origin allowlist (DNS rebinding mitigation) — configured, or wildcard / missing?
- Session ID source (framework CSPRNG, or builder-supplied?) and binding to auth identity
- Any unauthenticated routes (
/healthz,/sse, metadata endpoints) — do they leak tool lists or tenant hints? - MCP Authorization spec: if implemented, PKCE enforced, token audience (
aud) checked, resource indicators used
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 347 lines · 118 tokens per session scan A bdcf2da08d1c
security-pass is a skill published in the GitHub repository cyanheads/gdelt-mcp-server (5 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 118 tokens to every session and 5,026 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). It is 100% identical to security-pass, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
add-tool
Scaffold a new MCP tool definition. Use when the user asks to add a tool, create a new tool, or implement a new capability for the server.
orchestrations
Pick and run a multi-phase workflow that chains foundational task skills (git-wrapup, release-and-publish, maintenance, field-test, setup, etc.) end-to-end. Routes user intent to a workflow file under workflows/ — greenfield builds, maintenance + release, field-test + fix, or known-work + release. Single source for…
tool-defs-analysis
Read-only audit of MCP definition language across an existing surface — tools, resources, prompts, server instructions. Walks every definition file and checks 16 categories the LLM reads to decide whether and how to call: voice & tense, internal leaks, audience leaks, defaults, recovery hints, field descriptions…
add-app-tool
Scaffold an MCP App tool + UI resource pair. Use when the user asks to add a tool with interactive UI, create an MCP App, or build a visual/interactive tool.
add-resource
Scaffold a new MCP resource definition. Use when the user asks to add a resource, expose data via URI, or create a readable endpoint.
release-and-publish
Ship a release end-to-end across every registry the project targets (npm, MCP Registry, GitHub Releases for .mcpb bundles, GHCR). Runs the final verification gate, pushes commits and tags, then publishes to each applicable destination. Assumes git wrapup (version bumps, changelog, commit, annotated tag) is already…