deadeye-vapt

Deadeye VAPT

A whole-service vulnerability assessment and penetration test, static and whitebox: find this service's real attack surface, then find what an attacker reaches through it. This is not a diff review. /deadeye-guard and /deadeye-review catch what changed; this catches what's already there — the endpoint nobody touched this session, the auth check that was never written, the route still live from an API version everyone thinks is retired.

What this is not. No traffic is sent, no exploit is run, nothing outside this repository's source is touched — no network probing, no host/container/cloud-IAM layer, no runtime fuzzing. This is the source half of a VAPT: a whitebox read that reasons like an attacker with the code in hand, not the network half. Say this plainly in the output, not just here.

How this runs. Phase 0 (the four surface tracks below) and the ambiguous-scope gate run first, sequentially, as normal interactive turns — Phase 0 is a handful of greps, no fan-out needed, and the ambiguity gate needs a live turn to actually ask from (a Workflow runs to completion in the background with no pause point to ask mid-script). Once scope is settled, on Claude Code, load the workflow-authoring skill and run the rest as a Workflow: Phase 1 (attack-surface inventory) fans out across whichever surface tracks Phase 0 confirmed, then Phase 3/4 (triage + verify) fan out one agent per tag-family, each grounded in the Phase 2 trust-boundary map printed below — then one integration pass over every returned finding before the report (Phase 5) is generated. This is the default, not an opt-in — a whole-service pass is already the heaviest, least-frequent command here, and it spends meaningfully more tokens than a single-agent pass to get meaningfully more coverage; say so if asked why. Every other host has no Workflow tool — run every phase below as one agent there, same as always.

Set each agent's tier explicitly in the script — a Workflow's agent() calls run outside deadeye's own routing advisory (that only watches the interactive Agent tool, not a script's internal calls), so an untiered script silently inherits the session's own model for every agent, tiering nothing. Phase 1 inventory is grep-driven pattern matching: the cheapest tier that fits. Phase 3/4 verification needs real judgment: floor each tag-family agent at tier 1 (sonnet), reserving the top tier for a family touching a risky surface (authn/authz/crypto/inject/llm). Run the closing integration pass at the strongest tier available — it's the one place seeing every finding at once.